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This paper use income tax return data from 1960 to 2000 to analyze the link between reported
incomes and marginal tax rates. Only the top 1% incomes show evidence of behavioral responses
to taxation. The data displays striking heterogeneity in the size of responses to tax changes overtime,
with no response either short-term or long-term for the very large Kennedy top rate cuts in the
early1960s, and striking evidence of responses, at least in the short-term, to the tax changes since
the 1980s. The 1980s tax cuts generated a surge in business income reported by high income
individual taxpayers due to a shift away from the corporate sector, and the disappearance of business
losses for tax avoidance. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the recent 1993 tax increase generated
large short-term responses of wages and salaries reported by top income earners, most likely due to
re-timing in compensation to take advantage of the tax changes. However, it is unlikely that the
extraordinary trend upward of the shares of total wages accruing to top wage income earners, which
started in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s and especially the late 1990s, can be explained
solely by the evolution of marginal tax rates.
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Over the last 40 years, the U.S. federal income has undergone very large changes. Perhaps the
most striking change has been the dramatic decrease in top marginal income tax rates. From
1950 to the early 1960s, the statutory top marginal income tax rate was 91%. This top rate was
reduced to 70% by the Kennedy tax cuts in the mid 1960s. During the Reagan administrations
of the 1980s, the top tax rate was further reduced to 50% in 1982 by the Economic and Recovery
Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, and down to 28% in 1988 by the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986. The
top tax rate was then increased to 31% in 1991, and further to 39.6% in 1993 by the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993. The top rate has been changed by the 2001 tax
reform, it is currently 38.6% (year 2003) and is scheduled to decline to 35% by 2006. While
only about ﬁve hundred taxpayers were subject to the top marginal tax rate of 91% in the early
1960s, by 2000, more than half a million taxpayers are subject to the top rate.1 Thus, the
continuous and drastic progressivity of the federal income tax system up to the very highest
income taxpayers has been replaced by a much ﬂatter tax structure where an upper middle class
family can face the same marginal tax rate as the highest income earners in the United States.
In addition to the redistributive eﬀects, the dramatic reductions in top tax rates might
have generated large behavioral responses: the net-of-tax value of an additional dollar of pre-
tax income (excluding state and local taxes) for those in the highest bracket has experienced
enormous variations over the period, from less than 10 cents in the early 1960s to more than
70 cents by the late 1980s, and around 60 cents by 2000. It is plausible to think that such
variations might have had substantial eﬀects on the economic activity of high-income earners
such as labor supply decisions, career choices, and savings decisions, as well as on the form of
compensation (salary versus untaxed fringe beneﬁts for example). Indeed, the intellectual weight
behind the dramatic reduction in marginal tax rates in the 1980s was the logic of supply side
economics arguing that lower tax rates could generate important increases in economic activity,
and perhaps even tax revenues. As documented by Feenberg and Poterba (1993, 2000) and
Piketty and Saez (2003), there has indeed been an extraordinary increase in the share of total
income accruing to upper groups in the income distribution over the last 25 years. For example,
1The statistics on the number of taxpayers in each tax bracket have been reported in the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) annual publication Statistics of Income regularly since 1961.
2the income share of the top 1% taxpayers (excluding capital gains from the analysis), has surged
from less than 8% in the early 1970s to almost 17% in 2000 (Piketty and Saez, 2003). Feenberg
and Poterba (1993) pointed out that the timing of the increase in top income shares, and most
notably the surge in top income from 1986 to 1988 around TRA of 1986, appears to be closely
related to the cuts in top tax rates. Slemrod and Bakija (2000) and Piketty and Saez (2003)
note, however, that the surge in top incomes accelerated in the late 1990s, although top income
tax rates increased substantially in 1993.
The goal of the present paper is to understand the eﬀects of marginal income tax rates
on reported incomes by analyzing the shares and composition of incomes accruing to various
groups in the top tail of the income distribution, and the marginal income tax rates faced by
those groups. The analysis will focus on the 1960-2000 period because this period spans all the
important tax changes since World War II,2 and allows us to use the large and stratiﬁed public-
use tax return micro-ﬁles released by the IRS since 1960 as well as the TAXSIM tax calculator
created and maintained by the NBER to estimate marginal and average tax rates.3
There is a large literature trying to estimate the eﬀects of taxes on such decisions as labor
supply, savings, and retirement decisions. Over the past decade, a new literature has emerged
which has pointed out that these standard behavioral responses are only components of what
drives reported incomes; other responses such as the form of compensation, tax-deductible ac-
tivities, unmeasured eﬀort, and compliance also ultimately determine reported incomes, and
these may be more elastic with respect to taxation. Feldstein (1999) shows that, under certain
conditions, it is the overall elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate (one
minus the marginal tax rate) that is relevant for assessing the implications of tax changes for
revenue raising and welfare. The inﬂuential studies of Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995),
examining the 1980s tax cuts, estimated very large elasticities, in excess of one. This striking
conclusion has generated a substantial body of work on this central elasticity parameter and
generated a wide range of estimated elasticities, ranging from Feldstein and Lindsey’s estimates
at the high end to close to zero at the low end,4 depending on the estimation methodology and
2There are few studies on behavioral responses to taxation in the United States in the pre-war era. Goolsbee
(1999) provides a simple analysis of the most important episodes.
3See Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for a description of the TAXSIM calculator.
4See Gruber and Saez (2002) for a survey.
3the tax reforms considered.
It is important to note that, in contrast to most previous studies, our analysis focuses on
reported incomes before deductions such as adjustments to gross income, personal exemptions,
standard and itemized deductions. Therefore, our income concept is market income rather than
taxable income. As taxable income is a smaller base than gross income and as some components
of deductions such as charitable giving or mortgage interest deductions are also responsive to
marginal tax rates, the elasticities of taxable income are likely to be larger than the elasticities
of reported incomes that we analyze here.5.
Our analysis shows that only the reported incomes of taxpayers within the top 1% of the
income distribution appear to be responsive to changes in tax rates over the 1960-2000 period.
Even upper middle income class taxpayers (within the top decile but below the top 1%), which
experienced substantial changes in marginal tax rates, show no evidence of responses to taxation,
either in the short-run or the long-run. Attributing all the gains of the top 1% relative to the
average to the changes in tax rates produces very large elasticities of income with respect to
net-of-tax rates, in excess of one. However, allowing for simple secular and non-tax related time
trends in the top income share reduces the elasticity drastically (to about 0.5). Top income
shares within the top 1% show striking evidence of large and immediate responses to the tax
cuts of the 1980s, and the size of those responses is largest for the very top income groups. In
contrast, top incomes display no evidence of short or long-term response to the extremely large
changes in the net-of-tax rates following the Kennedy tax cuts in the early 1960s.
Data on the composition of income show that part of the response to the 1980s tax cuts has
been due to a sudden and permanent shift of corporate income toward the individual income
sector using partnerships and subchapter S corporations, legal entities taxed only at the individ-
ual level. However, most of the surge in top incomes since the 1970s has been due to a smooth
and extraordinary increase in the wages and salary component (which includes stock-option
exercises). This wage income surge started slowly in the early 1970s and has accelerated over
5Gruber and Saez (2002) ﬁnd indeed larger elasticities for taxable income than for Adjusted Gross Income.
We focus on gross income because the nature and size of deductions has changed considerably over time so
that, in contrast to gross income, it is not possible to construct consistent time series of “taxable income”. An
extensive literature has analyzed the response of the main components of itemized deductions such as charitable
contributions and interest deductions.
4the period, and especially during the last decade, and does not seem to be closely related to the
timing of the tax cuts. There is evidence of short-term responses of the wage income component
around TRA 1986 and OBRA 1993: top wages shares spike just after the tax reduction of 1986
and just before the tax increase of 1993, suggesting that highly paid employees were able to
re-time their compensation to take advantage of the tax changes. It is, however, very diﬃcult to
tell apart a long term eﬀect of tax cuts from a non-tax related secular widening of the disparity
of earnings.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the key identiﬁcation issues in estimating
behavioral elasticities of income with respect to marginal tax rates and shows how such elasticity
estimates can be used for tax policy analysis. Section 3 presents the results on income shares
and marginal tax rates, as well as the evolution of the composition of top incomes. Section 4
concludes by contrasting the U.S. experience with evidence from other countries.
2 Conceptual Framework and Methodology
2.1 Estimating Elasticities
The economic model underlying the estimation of behavioral responses to income taxation is
a simple extension of the static labor supply model. Individuals maximize a utility function
u(c,z) increasing in after tax income c (available for example for consumption) and decreasing
in before tax income z (earning income is costly for example). The budget constraint takes
the form c = (1 − τ)z + R where τ is the marginal tax rate and R is virtual income. Such
maximization generates an individual “reported income” function z(1−τ,R) which depends on
the net-of-tax rate 1−τ and virtual income R.6 Each individual has a particular income supply
function reﬂecting his skills, taste for labor, etc. Income eﬀects are assumed away so that the
income function z is independent of R and depends only on the net-of-tax rate.7 The key point
is that, in contrast to the standard labor supply model, not only changes in hours of work can
6This reported income supply function remains valid in the case of non-linear tax schedules, c = (1 − τ)z + R
then represents the linearized budget constraint at the utility maximizing point.
7Labor supply studies in general estimate modest income eﬀects (see Blundell and Pencavel, 1999 for a survey).
Gruber and Saez (2002) try to estimate both income and substitution eﬀects in the case of reported incomes, and
ﬁnd very small and insigniﬁcant income eﬀects.
5aﬀect earnings z but also intensity of work on the job, career choices, form of compensation,
tax-deductible activities, etc. The analysis below will show that it is indeed the full response of
reported incomes that is relevant for tax policy (a point made by Feldstein, 1999).
The literature on behavioral responses to taxation has attempted to use tax reforms to
identify the elasticity of reported incomes with respect to the net-of-tax rate deﬁned as, e =
[(1−τ)/z]∂z/∂(1−τ) in the notation used above. In order to isolate the eﬀects of the net-of-tax
rate, one would want to compare observed reported incomes after the tax rate change to the
incomes that would have been reported had the tax change not taken place. Obviously, the
latter are not observed and must be estimated. The simplest method consists in using as proxy
reported incomes before the reform and hence relate changes in reported incomes before and
after the reform to changes in tax rates.
Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995) applied this methodology to the ERTA 1981 and TRA
1986 tax changes and found that top income groups, which experienced the largest marginal tax
cuts, also experienced the largest gains in reported incomes. As a result, Lindsey (1987) and
Feldstein (1995) obtain very large elasticities, between 1 and 3, with preferred estimates around
1.5. There are several important issues with those estimates.
First, as pointed out by Slemrod (1996,1998) and Goolsbee (2000b), those elasticities will
be upward biased if, for non-tax related reasons, top incomes were increasing more rapidly than
average incomes during that period. A large body of work has suggested that non-tax factors,
such as skill biased technical progress, the development of international trade, or the decline of
unions might have lead to a substantial increase in earnings disparity in the 1980s (see Katz
and Autor, 1999 for a survey). To overcome this issue, it would be preferable to compare
taxpayers with similar incomes rather than comparing high incomes to middle incomes. In the
case of income taxation, this is diﬃcult for two reasons. First, for most reforms, taxpayers with
similar incomes face very similar tax changes.8 Second, although the discontinuity in marginal
tax rates due to the progressive bracket structure creates sharp changes in marginal incentives
for taxpayers with very similar incomes,9 this cannot be satisfactorily exploited to estimate
8In contrast, redistributive programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit which is targeted to taxpayers
with children, allows to use taxpayers with no children but similar income as a plausibly better control group to
identify the eﬀects of the program (see, e.g., Eissa and Liebman, 1996).
9Saez (2003) tries to exploit this feature and the ‘bracket creep’ from 1979 to 1981 to identify behavioral
6elasticities because it appears that taxpayers either control imperfectly their incomes or are
not well aware of the details of the tax code and their precise location on the tax schedule.10
Therefore, it is conceivable that only large or salient tax changes are likely to generate behavioral
responses, raising some interesting and complicated issues about the estimation of behavioral
responses and the design of tax policy (see Liebman and Zeckhauser (2003) for an analysis along
those lines).
Second, comparing years just before and just after the reform might reveal a short-term elas-
ticity, which can be quite diﬀerent from the long-term elasticity, which is the relevant parameter
for tax policy. Slemrod (1995) discusses this point and Goolsbee (2000a) shows convincingly
that executives exercised massively stock options in 1992 in order to avoid the higher tax rate
starting in 1993, creating a large short-term elasticity of reported income around OBRA 1993;
the longer term elasticity was much smaller and possibly equal to zero.11 Looking at times series
spanning a number of years before and after the reform, as in Poterba and Feenberg (1993),
can be helpful to make progress on those two issues. Slemrod (1996) proposes an aggregate
time-series regression framework, for the period 1954 to 1990, to try and disentangle tax and
non-tax inﬂuences on the share and composition of income accruing to the top .5% taxpayers.
Third, the Lindsey and Feldstein studies assume implicitly that reported income elasticities
are the same for all income groups and, as we will see, the data strongly suggests that those
taxpayers with very high incomes are much more responsive to taxation than taxpayers in the
middle or upper middle class. More precisely, instead of adopting the simple diﬀerence method
just described, they compare changes in the incomes of the very high incomes (experiencing the
largest tax rate changes), to changes in incomes of the middle and upper middle class (experi-
encing more modest tax changes). This diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences of (log) incomes is then divided
by the corresponding diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences of (log) net-of-tax rates to obtain an elasticity
responses.
10Saez (2002) documents in detail the fact that we do not observe bunching, as predicted by theory, at the kink
points of the tax schedule.
11Feldstein and Feenberg (1996) noted a decrease in top reported incomes from 1992 to 1993 and interpreted this
ﬁnding as evidence of large behavioral elasticities. As compensation of executives continued to soar throughout
the late 1990s, negative long-run elasticity estimates would be obtained by repeating Goolsbee’s analysis and
comparing incomes in 1992 to those of the late 1990s.
7estimate of the form:
ˆ e =
∆log(zH) − ∆log(zM)
∆log(1 − τH) − ∆log(1 − τM)
where zH, zM and τH, τM denote the incomes and marginal tax rates of the high (H) and
middle (M) income groups respectively; and ∆ denotes the changes from before to after the tax
change. But suppose that the middle class has a zero elasticity so that ∆log(zM) = 0 and that
high income individuals have an elasticity of e so that ∆log(zH) = e∆log(1 − τH). Assume
further that the middle class experiences an increase in its net-of-tax rates that is half as large
as that experienced by the high income taxpayers so that ∆log(1 − τM) = 0.5 · ∆log(1 − τH).
Then, the estimated elasticity ˆ e will be twice the true elasticity e of the high income group, a
dramatic upward bias in the estimate. This simple but realistic example shows that it is not
appropriate to rely on comparisons of the responsiveness of the reported incomes of the middle
and upper income groups when there is a strong suspicion that the behavioral elasticities for the
two groups are quite diﬀerent.
Fourth, the increases in top incomes following the 1980s tax changes might have been due
in part to income shifting rather than creation of new income. As we show below, the critical
distinction for policy and welfare analysis, is whether the increase in reported incomes comes at
the expense of untaxed activities (such as leisure, fringe beneﬁts, perquisites) or taxed activities
(such as proﬁts in the corporate sector, future capital gains, deferred compensation such as
pensions). Slemrod (1996) points out that part of the surge in top incomes following TRA 1986
was due to a dramatic increase in S-corporation income, suggesting that many business owners
switched the legal form of their corporations from subchapter C (facing the corporate income
tax on their proﬁts) toward subchapter S (which do not face the corporate tax and whose proﬁts
are taxed directly at the individual level) as the top individual income tax rate became lower
than the corporate income tax rate by 1988.12 Carroll and Joulfaian (1997) explore this issue
12A C-corporation faces the corporate tax on its proﬁts. Proﬁts are then taxed again at the individual level
if paid out as dividends. If proﬁts are retained in the corporation, they may generate capital gains that are
taxed at the individual level but in general more favorably than dividends, when they are realized. Proﬁts from
S-corporations (or partnerships and sole proprietorships) are taxed directly and solely at the individual level.
Distributions from S-corporations to individual owners generate no additional tax. Thus, a S-corporation is
ﬁscally more advantageous than the C-corporation the lower the individual tax rate, the higher the corporate tax
8in more detail using a panel of corporations from 1985 to 1990, and conﬁrm Slemrod’s (1996)
earlier ﬁndings. Gordon and Slemrod (2000) perform a systematic study of income shifting by
analyzing simultaneously tax changes and reported incomes at the corporate and personal level.
In this paper, we analyze in detail the composition of reported individual incomes in order to
cast light on the source of the changes in reported incomes following tax reforms.
The early studies by Lindsey (1987) and Feenberg and Poterba (1993) used the large and
stratiﬁed annual cross-sectional public-use tax return data to document the evolution of top
reported incomes. Following Feldstein (1995) inﬂuential analysis of the TRA 1986, a number
of studies have used panel data to estimate elasticities. The main justiﬁcation put forward for
using panel data instead of repeated cross-sections is that it might alleviate the issue of non-tax
related changes in income inequality, as the same individuals are followed from before to after the
reform. However, it is plausible to think that an increase in income inequality might be in large
part due to high income individuals experiencing larger gains than lower income individuals,
in which case a panel analysis does not solve the issue. Furthermore, a tax cut might induce
middle incomes to try harder to become rich, and this behavioral response will be missed by a
Feldstein type panel data analysis.
The use of panel data has two additional important drawbacks. First, the publicly available
panel of tax returns is not stratiﬁed, and hence does not allow nearly as precise a study of
the evolution of top incomes as the large stratiﬁed cross-sections.13 Second, comparing groups
ranked according to pre-reform incomes generates a mean reversion problem: if there is mobility
in incomes from year to year, then it can cause high income taxpayers in one year to appear low
income in the next, aside from any true behavioral response.14 Eliminating this mobility bias
requires to control for pre-reform income in the estimation but this will weaken and possibly
destroy identiﬁcation as the size of net-of-tax rates changes is closely correlated with income.15
rate, and the higher the capital gains tax rate (see Scholes (1992), Chapter 4, for extensive details and examples).
A business can switch to and from the C and S status but S-corporations cannot have more than a limited number
of stock-holders (75 currently), issue more than one class of stock, or be a subsidiary of other corporations.
13Auten and Carroll (1999) have used a larger panel available only at the Treasury to compare years 1985 and
1989. It is, however, diﬃcult to create longer panels to analyze longer term time series because of attrition issues.
14This would generate a downward bias in the elasticity estimates in the case of a tax rate decrease such as
TRA 1986 and an upward bias in the case of a tax rate increase such as OBRA 1993.
15This point is discussed in Gruber and Saez (2002) who overcome this problem by using many years instead
9Many authors, including Lindsey (1987) himself, have argued that comparing income groups
using repeated cross-sections is a valid strategy only if taxpayers stay in the same groups from
year to year. However, following a tax rate cut such as ERTA 1981 or TRA 1986, one would
like to know how the distribution of reported income has changed relative to a scenario where
the tax change does not take place. Whether or not there is mobility in incomes from year to
year is independent of this question, as long as the income distribution is stationary (absent
the tax change). In contrast, mobility in incomes is precisely what complicates the panel data
analysis. Panel data, however, have key advantages to study some questions more subtle than
the overall response of reported incomes. For example, if one wants to study how a tax change
aﬀects income mobility (for example, do more middle incomes becomes successful entrepreneurs
following a tax rate cut?), panel data is clearly necessary.
Measuring the tax induced change in the income distribution is exactly what is needed
to derive the tax revenue consequences of the tax change. Because we do not observe the
counterfactual income distribution when no tax change takes place, we have to rely on income
distributions from previous years, and there is no systematic bias in the repeated cross-section
analysis as long as the income distribution remains stationary, absent the tax change. The direct
focus on the income distribution series over-time allows a much more concrete and simple grasp
on the evolution of incomes for diﬀerent groups than panel analysis, as it is straightforward
to divide the population into various percentiles for each year, and analyze simultaneously the
evolution of the incomes and the marginal tax rates of these groups. By relating the changes in
incomes to the changes in net-of-tax rates, we can obtain elasticity estimates.
Finally, Slemrod (1998) and Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) make the important point that
the elasticity of reported incomes with respect to tax rates might not be a ﬁxed parameter and
depends on the legal details and the enforcement of the tax system: for example, if it is easy
for corporations to switch from subchapter C to subchapter S to avoid taxes, the individual tax
base might be much more elastic than in a setting where subchapter S corporations do not exist.
Kopczuk (2003) performs an empirical analysis of this issue for the United States from 1979 to
1990, and shows that taxable income elasticities are negatively related to the base of incomes
of just two in the analysis. The implicit assumption they need to make, however, is that mobility remains stable
from year to year.
10subject to taxes. This results suggests that introducing additional deductions increases the
responsiveness of taxable incomes. Goolsbee (1999) studies the key tax changes in the United
States since the 1920s and ﬁnds enormous heterogeneity in the observed responses from episode
to episode, although he does not try to explain the discrepancies. The present analysis of the
period 1960-2000 also displays signiﬁcant heterogeneity in responses over time.
2.2 Using Elasticities for Tax Policy
The empirical analysis that follows will show that evidence of behavioral responses to changes
in marginal tax rates is concentrated in the top of the income distribution, with little evidence
of any response for the middle and upper-middle income class.16 Therefore, it is useful to focus
on the analysis of the eﬀects of increasing the marginal tax rate on the upper end of the income
distribution. Let us therefore assume that incomes in the top bracket, above a given threshold
¯ z, face a constant marginal tax rate τ.17 We denote by N the number of taxpayers in the top
bracket.
We assume that incomes reported in the top bracket depend on the net-of-tax rate 1 − τ,
and we denote by z(1 − τ) the average income reported by taxpayers in the top bracket. As
discussed above, we assume away income eﬀects in the analysis and thus the net-of-tax rate
is the only relevant parameter. The elasticity (compensated or uncompensated, as there are
no income eﬀects) of income in the top bracket with respect to the net-of-tax rate is therefore
deﬁned as e = [(1 − τ)/z]∂z/∂(1 − τ). Suppose that the government increases the top tax rate
τ by a small amount dτ (with no change in the tax schedule for incomes below ¯ z). This small
tax reform has two eﬀects on tax revenue. First, there is a mechanical increase in tax revenue
due to the fact that taxpayers face a higher tax rate on their incomes above ¯ z. Hence, the total
mechanical eﬀect is
16The low end of the income distribution is out of the scope of the present paper because many low income
families and individuals do not ﬁle income tax returns. The large literature on responses to welfare and in-
come transfer programs targeted toward low incomes has, however, displayed evidence of signiﬁcant labor supply
responses (see e.g., Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001 for a recent analysis).
17In the case of year 2003 tax law, for example, taxable incomes above ¯ z = $311,950, are taxed at the top
marginal tax rate of τ = 38.6%.
11dM = N[z − ¯ z]dτ.
This mechanical eﬀect is the projected increase in tax revenue, absent any behavioral response.
Second, the increase in the tax rate triggers a behavioral response which reduces the average
reported income in the top bracket by dz = −e·z ·dτ/(1−τ) on average and hence produces a
loss in tax revenue equal to




Summing the mechanical and the behavioral eﬀect, we obtain the total change in tax revenue
due to the tax change:
dR = dM + dB = Ndτ(z − ¯ z) ·

1 − e ·
z






Let us denote by a the ratio z/(z − ¯ z). Note that a ≥ 1 and that a = 1 when ¯ z = 0, that is,
when there is a single ﬂat tax rate applying to all incomes. If the top tail of the distribution
is Pareto distributed,18 then the parameter a does not vary with ¯ z and is exactly equal to the
Pareto parameter. As the tails of actual income distributions are very well approximated by
Pareto distributions, it turns out that the coeﬃcient a is extremely stable for ¯ z above $200,000.
Saez (2001) provides such an empirical analysis for 1992 and 1993 incomes using tax return
data. The parameter a measures the thinness of the top tail of the income the distribution:
the thicker the tail of the distribution, the larger is z relative to ¯ z, and hence the smaller a.
Feenberg and Poterba (1993) provide estimates of the Pareto parameter a from 1951 to 1990
for the distribution of AGI in the United States using income tax returns and show that a has
decreased from about 2.5 in the early 1970s to around 1.5 in the late 1980s.19
We can rewrite the eﬀect of the small reform on tax revenue dR simply as:
18A Pareto distribution has a density function of the form f(z) = C/z
1+α where C and α are constant param-
eters. α is called the Pareto parameter.
19Piketty and Saez (2003) provide estimates of thresholds ¯ z and average incomes z corresponding to various
fractiles within the top decile of the U.S. income distribution from 1913 to 2000, allowing a straightforward
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Formula (1) is of central importance. It shows that the fraction of tax revenue lost through
behavioral responses – the second term in the square bracket expression – is a simple function
increasing in the tax rate τ, the elasticity e, and the Pareto parameter a. This expression is
also equal to the marginal deadweight burden created by the increase in the tax rate. More
precisely, because of the envelope theorem, the behavioral response creates no additional welfare
loss as the individual is maximizing utility, and thus the utility loss (in dollar terms) created by
the tax increase is exactly equal to the mechanical eﬀect dM. However, tax revenue collected is
only dR = dM +dB with dB < 0. Thus −dB represents indeed the extra amount lost in utility
over and above the tax revenue collected dR. The marginal excess burden expressed in terms of





e · a · τ
1 − τ − e · a · τ
. (2)
Those formulas are valid for any tax rate τ and income distribution, even if individuals
have heterogeneous utility functions and behavioral elasticities.20 as long as income eﬀects are
assumed away. Thus, this formula should be preferred to the Harberger triangle approximations
which require small tax rates to be valid. The parameters τ and a are straightforward to obtain,
the elasticity parameter e is thus the central non-trivial parameter necessary to make use of
formulas (1) and (2). For example, in 2000, for the top .5% income cut-oﬀ (corresponding
approximately to the top 39.6% federal income tax bracket in that year), Piketty and Saez
(2003) estimate that a = 1.6. For an elasticity estimate e = 0.5, corresponding to the mid
to upper range of the estimates from the literature, the fraction of tax revenue lost through
behavioral responses (dB/dM), should the top tax rate be slightly increased, would be 52.5%,
more than half of the mechanical projected increase in tax revenue. In terms of marginal excess
burden, increasing tax revenue by $1 requires to create a utility loss of 1/(1 − .525) = $2.11 for
taxpayers, and hence a marginal excess burden of $1.11 or 111% of the extra $1 tax collected.
Following the supply-side debates of the early 1980s, much attention has been focused on the
tax rate maximizing tax revenue, the so-called “Laﬀer rate”. The Laﬀer rate τ∗ maximizes tax
20The elasticity e is the average (income weighted) of individual elasticities.
13revenue, hence the bracketed expression in equation (1) is exactly zero when τ = τ∗. Rearranging
the equation, we obtain the following simple formula for the Laﬀer tax rate τ∗ for the top bracket:
τ∗ =
1
1 + a · e
. (3)
A top tax rate above the Laﬀer rate is a very ineﬃcient situation because decreasing the tax
rate would both increase government revenue and the utility of high income taxpayers.21 At the
Laﬀer rate, the excess burden becomes inﬁnite as raising more tax revenue becomes impossible.
Using our previous example with e = 0.5 and a = 1.6, the Laﬀer rate τ∗ would be 55.6%, not
much higher than the combined maximum federal, state, medicare, and sales tax rate. Note that
when ¯ z = 0, and the tax system has a single tax rate, the Laﬀer rate becomes the well-known
expression τ∗ = 1/(1 + e). As a ≥ 1, the ﬂat rate maximizing tax revenue is always larger than
the Laﬀer rate for high incomes only. This is because increasing the top tax rate collects extra
taxes only on the portion of incomes above the bracket threshold ¯ z but produces a behavioral
response for high incomes as large as an across the board increase in marginal tax rates.
The analysis has assumed so far that the reduction in incomes due to the tax rate increase
has no other eﬀect on tax revenue. This is a reasonable assumption if the reduction in incomes
is due to reduced labor supply (and hence an increase in untaxed leisure time), or due to a shift
from cash compensation toward untaxed fringe beneﬁts or perquisites (more generous health
insurance, better oﬃces, company cars, etc.). However, in many instances, the reduction in
reported incomes is due in part to a shift away from individual income toward other forms of
taxable income such as corporate income, or deferred compensation, that will be taxable to the
individual when paid out (see Slemrod, 1998). For example and we will come back to this later
on in detail, Slemrod (1996) and Gordon and Slemrod (2000) show convincingly that part of the
surge in top incomes after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was due to a shift of income from the
21In the case where the government has strong redistributive tastes and does not value the marginal consumption
of high income individuals relative to the average individual, the optimal income tax rate for high incomes is exactly
equal to the Laﬀer rate (3). In the general case where the government values the marginal consumption of high
incomes at 0 ≤ g < 1, the optimal tax rate for the high incomes is such that the bracketed expression in (1) is
equal to g. See Saez (2001) for a more detailed exposition following the classical optimal income tax theory of
Mirrlees (1971).
14corporate sector toward the individual sector.
Let us therefore assume that the incomes that disappear from the individual income tax
base following the tax rate increase dτ are shifted to other bases taxed at rate t on average.
For example, if two thirds of the reduction in individual reported incomes is due to increased
leisure and one third is due to a shift toward the corporate sector, t would be one third of the
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. (4)
The same envelope theorem logic applies for welfare analysis and the marginal deadweight burden
formula is also modiﬁed accordingly by replacing e·a·τ by e·a·(τ −t) in both numerator and
denominator of (2). The Laﬀer rate (3) becomes:
τ∗ =
1 + t · a · e
1 + a · e
. (5)
If we assume again that a = 1.6 and e = .5, but that incomes disappearing from the individual
base are taxed at t = 20% on average, the fraction of revenue lost due to behavioral responses
drops from 52.5% to 26%, and the marginal excess burden (expressed as a percentage of extra
taxes raised) decreases from 111% to 35%, if the initial top tax rate is τ = 39.6%. The Laﬀer
rate increases from 55.6% to 64.5%. This simple theoretical analysis shows therefore, that, in
addition to estimating the elasticity e, it is critical to analyze the source or destination of changes
in reported individual incomes.
2.3 Data and Methodology
We estimate the level and shares of total income accruing to various upper income groups using
the large cross-sectional individual tax return data annually released by the IRS since 1960.22
The data are a stratiﬁed sample of tax returns oversampled for high-income taxpayers, allowing
an extremely precise analysis of top reported incomes. The top income shares are estimated
22There is no micro data for years 1961, 1963, and 1965.
15based on the Piketty and Saez (2003) analysis.23 The unit of analysis is the tax unit deﬁned
as a married couple living together (with dependents) or a single adult (with dependents), as
in the current tax law. It is important to keep in mind that top income shares series measured
at the tax unit level, as we do here, might be diﬀerent from series estimated at the individual
level. As displayed in Table A, since 1960, the average number of individuals per tax unit has
decreased from 2.6 to 2.1 due to the decrease in the average number of dependent children per tax
unit as well as the decrease in the fraction of married tax units. Those long-term demographic
changes imply that real average income growth per tax unit will be substantially smaller than
real income growth per capita. These demographic changes can also aﬀect top income shares
if the reduction in tax units size is not uniform across income groups. However, the tax return
data show that the reduction in tax unit size has been about the same for high incomes than
for the U.S. population as a whole. From 1960 to 2000, the number of individuals per tax unit
in the top decile has declined from 3.6 to 2.9, which is the same 20% decline as in the general
population (from 2.6 to 2.1).
From 1960 to 2000, the fraction of married tax units has declined from about 60% to 50% for
the population at large (due to the increased number of single parents and non married couples)
but only from 90% to 85% for the top decile tax units. An increase in single tax units with lower
incomes contributes to increasing top income shares. Similarly, an increase in the correlation
of earnings between spouses (due for example to increased labor force participation of married
women) would also increase top income shares estimated at the tax unit level. Those slow
moving demographic changes, however, are small relative to the dramatic trends we document
and can only explain at best a very small fraction of the changes in the very top income shares.
Each upper income group is deﬁned relative to the total number of potential tax units in
the entire U.S. population, estimated from population and family census data as the sum of
married men, divorced and widowed men and women, and of single adults never married (aged
20 and above).24 The income deﬁnition we use is consistent over time and includes all income
23The main (and very minor) diﬀerence is that government transfers such as Social Security beneﬁts and
Unemployment Compensation have been excluded from the income deﬁnition in this paper in order to obtain
better consistency in the income deﬁnition over years. The estimates have been extended to year 2000.
24From 1960 to 2000, between 90 and 95% of potential tax units actually ﬁled an income tax return, as many
non-taxable families ﬁle in order to get tax refunds.
16items excluding realized capital gains25 reported on tax returns and before all deductions such
as adjustments to gross income, exemptions, itemized and standard deductions. We exclude
government transfers such as Social Security (SS) beneﬁts and Unemployment Insurance (UI)
beneﬁts. Thus, our income measure is deﬁned as Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) less realized
capital gains included in AGI, less taxable SS and UI beneﬁts, plus all the adjustments to
gross income. Hence, our measure of income is a broader measure than taxable income on which
many previous studies have focused. If deductions to income such as charitable giving, mortgage
interest payments, etc. are also responsive to taxation, taxable income might be more responsive
to tax rates than our broader income measure. However, as the nature of deductions allowed
has changed substantially over the period 1960-2000, it is impossible to construct a consistent
taxable income deﬁnition over the full period. As a result, we refer the reader to previous studies
analyzing speciﬁcally the components of taxable income that we exclude from the analysis.
As in Piketty and Saez (2003), we consider various groups within the top decile of the income
distribution. In order to get a more concrete sense of those upper income groups, Table 1 displays
the thresholds, the average income level in each group, along with the number of tax units in
each group, all for 2000. The median income, as well as the average income for the bottom 90%
of tax units is quite low, around $25,000. Those numbers are smaller than those reported by
the Census Bureau based on the Current Population Survey (CPS) for two reasons. First, our
income deﬁnition does not include any government transfers. Second, CPS income is reported
at the household level which is a larger unit than the tax unit we consider.26
The groups in the top decile below the top 1% (the top 10-5% denotes the bottom half
of the top decile, and the top 5-1%, the next 4 percentiles) have average incomes of $100,000
and $160,000 respectively, which corresponds, perhaps surprisingly given how far up the income
distribution those groups are, to the popular view of the middle and upper middle income class.
In 2000, an annual family income of at least $280,000 is required to be part of the top 1%.
Hence, the top 1% corresponds perhaps to the popular view of the high incomes. About 140,000
tax units (or slightly more than 0.1% of all tax units) report incomes larger than one million
25Realized capital gains are excluded because they form a very volatile component of income and face in general
a diﬀerent tax treatment than other forms of income. There is a large literature focusing on the response of capital
gains realizations to tax changes. See Auerbach (1988) for a survey.
26For example, a cohabiting couple or two roommates form a single household but two tax units.
17dollars (the very high incomes). Finally, the top .01%, the smallest top group we consider, is
formed by the top 13,400 tax units, reporting on average $13 million of annual income in 2000,
these are the super high income American families.
We estimate shares of income by dividing the income amounts accruing to each group by re-
ported income, where we have assumed that non-ﬁling units earn 20% of the average income.27
We then estimate the composition of income for each group and we consider seven compo-
nents: salaries and wages (including exercised stock-options, bonuses, and private pensions),
S-corporation income, sole proprietorship (Schedule C income) and farm income, partnership
income, dividends, interest income, and other income (including smaller item such as rents,
royalties, and other miscellaneous items).
Marginal tax rates are estimated using the TAXSIM tax calculator. For each individual
record, we compute a weighted marginal tax rate based on wage income and other income as
various provisions in the tax code generate diﬀerences in the tax treatment of wage income and
other forms of income. For each income group, we then estimate an average marginal tax rate
weighted by income.28 It is important to note that our marginal tax rate computations ignore
state income taxes because the data does not provide state information for high income earners.
Our tax measure also ignores other taxes such as social security and medicare taxes, corporate
taxes, and non-income taxes such as sales and excise taxes.
We use the same methodology to compute top wage shares using wages and salaries reported
on tax returns. Wages and salaries include exercised stock-options and bonuses. In this case,
groups are deﬁned relative to the total number of tax units with positive wage income estimated
as the number of part-time and full workers from the National Income and Product Accounts less
the number of married women who are employees. The sum of total wages in the economy used
to compute shares is obtained from National Income and Product Accounts (total compensation
of employees). The marginal tax rates for upper wage income groups are of course those relevant
for wages and salaries and are also weighted by wage income (see Table A).
We propose a very simple time series regression methodology to obtain various elasticity
estimates, and illustrate some of the identiﬁcation diﬃculties. Because of potential heterogene-
27As only between 5 and 10% of tax units do not ﬁle returns, our results are not sensitive to this assumption.
28As we saw above, for tax policy analysis, it is necessary to weight marginal tax rates by income.
18ity in elasticities across income groups, all our regressions are run for a single income group.
The simplest speciﬁcation consists in regressing log real incomes on log net-of-tax rates (and a
constant) for a given group. Of course, as real incomes grow over time, we can add time trends
in the regression to control for exogenous (i.e., non-tax related) real income growth. Those es-
timates are unbiased estimates of behavioral elasticities, if absent any tax change, real incomes
in that speciﬁc group do not change (ﬁrst speciﬁcation) or follow a regular time pattern (second
speciﬁcation). These assumptions may not be met. As many years of data are included, these
estimates capture mostly the long-term behavioral elasticities.29 As we will see, the pattern of
average incomes for the full population does no appear to be related to the evolution of average
marginal tax rates, therefore, in order to control for average income growth, we run most of the
regressions in terms of log income shares instead of log average incomes.30 Those regressions
control automatically for overall income growth. Adding time trends in that case amounts to
assuming that incomes for the particular group considered may diverge from the average income
in the economy. As we are running time-series regressions and the error terms appear to be
correlated over time (according to the standard Durbin-Watson test), OLS standard errors are
not correct. Therefore, we compute the Newey-West standard errors assuming that the error
terms can be correlated up to an eight year lag.31
Due to the progressive structure of the income tax, increases in incomes lead to higher
marginal tax rates because of bracket-creep. As a result, an increase in top income shares (for
non-tax related reasons) might also induce a mechanical increase in the marginal tax rate faced
by those high incomes, hence potentially biasing downward our elasticity estimates. A simple
way to investigate the extent of the problem is to use the statutory top marginal income tax
rate (or more precisely the log of one minus the top rate) as an instrument for the eﬀective log
net-of-tax rate variable. Our results show that the OLS and IV estimates are extremely close,
suggesting that this bracket-creep issue does not create a signiﬁcant estimation problem.
29We leave for future research the regression analysis of the dynamics of tax responses. Such a formal analysis
has been attempted in the case of capital gains realizations (see, e.g., Auerbach, 1988).
30Slemrod (1996) adopted the same approach, although he controlled for non-tax factors explicitly rather than
using general time trends controls as we do here.
31An eight year lag is close to maximizing the size of the standard errors, and thus should be seen as conservative.
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3.1 Trends in Average Incomes
We depict on Figure 1, the average federal marginal individual income tax rate (weighted by
income) and the average income (per tax unit) reported in real terms for the full population
from 1960 to 2000. Incomes are expressed in 2000 dollars using the standard CPI-U deﬂator
(see Table A). Figure 1 shows that real incomes increased quickly from 1960 to 1973 and then
hardly increased until the early 1990s. From 1993 to 2000, real incomes have increased quickly
but are only 13% higher than in 1973. Real growth depends critically on the CPI deﬂator.
Improvements in the CPI estimation have been made over the years and some of them have
been incorporated retrospectively in the so-called CPI-U-RS deﬂator (see Stewart and Reed,
1999). Using the CPI-U-RS instead of the CPI-U would display about 29% real income growth
instead of 13% from 1973 to 2000 (see Table A).
Average marginal tax rates display signiﬁcant movements with a steady increase from 21-
22% to 30% from the mid 1960s to the early 1980s (with a temporary surge during the Vietnam
war surtaxes in 1968-70). In the 1980s, the average marginal tax rate decreased to 23%, and
increased slightly to 26% during the 1990s. Figure 1 displays no clear relation between the level
of real incomes and the level of marginal tax rates. As displayed in Table 2, Panel A, a simple
OLS regression of log average incomes on the log of the net-of-tax rate controlling or not for
time trends to account for exogenous economic growth, display insigniﬁcant elasticity coeﬃcients.
Therefore, the aggregate data displays no evidence of signiﬁcant behavioral responses of reported
incomes to changes in the average marginal tax rate.
Figure 2 shows a striking contrast between the bottom 99% tax units (Panel A) and the
top 1% (Panel B). The average real income of the bottom 99% increased steadily from 1960 to
1973 and then stagnated: real incomes in 2000 are hardly higher than in 1973.32 The decline in
marginal tax rates faced by the bottom 99% from almost 30% in 1981 to around 23% in 2000
does not seem to have noticeably improved the growth of real incomes. Indeed as shown in Table
32If one uses the CPI-U-RS deﬂator, the bottom 99% real incomes would have grown by about 13%. In any
case, it is clear that real growth of incomes has been very slow in last quarter of the 20th century relative to the
1950-1973 period. It is also important to note that this slow growth is not due to a decrease in the number of
adults per tax units (see Table A).
202, Panel B, regressing the log average incomes on the log net-of-tax rate for the bottom 99%
displays negative (although insigniﬁcant) coeﬃcients whether or not a time trend is included.
In stark contrast, the average real income of the top 1% has increased by 160% since the
early 1970s (or by 200% if one uses the CPI-U-RS), and the average marginal tax rate has also
declined substantially, from around 50% before 1981 to less than 30% by 1988. It is striking to
note that the top 1% incomes start increasing precisely in 1981 when marginal tax rates start
going down. The jump in top incomes from 1986 to 1988 corresponds exactly to the sharp drop
in marginal tax rates from 45% to 29% after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. These points, ﬁrst
noted by Poterba and Feenberg (1993), suggest that high incomes are indeed quite responsive
to taxation. The other striking feature of the ﬁgure is the extraordinary increase in top incomes
from 1994-2000 in spite of the increase in tax rates from about 32% to almost 40% in 1993.
Thus, although the marginal tax rates faced by the high incomes in 2000 are hardly lower than
in the mid-1980s (39% instead of 44-45%), top incomes are more than twice larger.
Figure 2 illustrates very well the diﬃculty of obtaining convincing estimates of the elasticity
of reported income with respect to the net-of-tax rate. It seems clear that the sharp, and
unprecedented, increase in incomes from 1986 to 1988 is related to the large decrease in marginal
tax rates that happened exactly during those years. The central question, however, is whether
this short-term response persists overtime. In particular, how should we interpret the continuing
rise in top incomes in since 1994? If one thinks that this surge is evidence of diverging trends
between high incomes and the rest of the population independent of tax policy, which started
in the 1970s, then it is tempting to consider the response of TRA 1986 as a purely short-term
spike followed by lower growth from 1988 to 1993, before getting back to the normal upward
trend by 1994. On the other hand, one could argue that the surge in top incomes since the
mid-1990s might have been the long-term consequence of the decrease in tax rates in the 1980s
and that such a surge would not have occurred, had high incomes tax rates remained high as in
the 1960s and 1970s. We come back to this point later on.
Those issues are illustrated formally in the regression results of Table 2, Panel C. When no
time trend is included in the regression of log income on log net-of-tax rate, all the growth in top
incomes is attributed to the decline in top rates, and the elasticity obtained is extremely large
1.83 (.37). In contrast, including a time trend produces a much smaller, although still sizeable,
21elasticity .71 (.22) because part of the rise in top incomes is attributed to a secular rise. Adding
an additional time square control further reduces the elasticity to 0.5 (0.18).
This analysis also shows that, comparing two single years by taking the ratio of the diﬀerence
in log incomes to the diﬀerence in log net-of tax rates, as done in most studies, can produce a
wide range of elasticity estimates. Comparing 1981 to 1984, as in Lindsey (1987), would produce
an elasticity of 0.77.33 Comparing 1985 and 1988, as in Feldstein (1995) and Auten and Carroll
(1999), would produce an extremely large 1.7 elasticity.34 In contrast, comparing 1991 to 1994
(as in Goolsbee, 2000a) would produce a zero elasticity because top incomes are about constant
while tax rates increase by almost 10 percentage points.35 The elasticity would even become
negative if one compares 1991 to the late 1990s as both top incomes and the tax rate have
increased.36 The large micro-data sets can be used to obtain those simple elasticity estimates
directly from regressions at the individual level as done in many studies, with very small standard
errors. The regression counterpart would be to pool the samples of top 1% earners for the pre
and post reform years, and run a 2SLS regression of log incomes on log net-of-tax rate using
as an instrument a post year dummy.37 In order to cast further light on those issues and try
to separate tax eﬀects from other eﬀects, we turn to a closer analysis of various upper income
groups, with particular emphasis on the change in the composition of reported incomes.
33Lindsey obtains larger estimates because he compares the upper income to the middle income groups, creating
an upward bias if, as is apparent in the data, elasticities are increasing with income (see discussion above).
34Auten and Carroll (1999) obtain a much smaller 0.6 elasticity because they compare 1985 to 1989 (instead of
1988 as Feldstein) and because of the mean reversion issue discussed above which is diﬃcult to correct with only
two years of data.
35In contrast, comparing 1992 to 1993 would produce a signiﬁcant short-term elasticity of 0.63 as in Feldstein
and Feenberg (1996).
36Carroll (1998) and Sammartino and Wiener (1997) analyze panel tax return data also show that short term
responses around OBRA 1992 are much larger than longer term responses.
37It is doubtful, however, that those small standard errors would be accurate, as random year eﬀects are
most likely to be present in the data making 2SLS standard errors far too low and hence worthless (in addition
to creating the identiﬁcation problems discussed above). See Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2003) for a
detailed discussion of those econometric issues.
223.2 Trends in Top Income Shares and Marginal Tax Rates
We have shown that average real incomes do not seem to respond to average marginal tax rates
in the aggregate, and that responses seem to be concentrated in the upper 1% fraction of the
income distribution. Therefore, from now on, we normalize top incomes by considering the shares
of total income accruing to various upper groups (as in Feenberg and Poterba, 1993 and 2000,
and Piketty and Saez, 2003). This has two advantages. First, the income share measures are
independent of the CPI deﬂator used. Second, the top shares are automatically normalized for
overall real and nominal growth in incomes. All our top income share series and corresponding
average marginal tax rates (income weighted) are reported in Tables B1 and B2 respectively.
Table 3 displays a number of regressions of the (log) top 1% income share on the log net-of-tax
rate, varying the number of time trends controls and instrumenting or not the tax variable with
the log net-of-tax top rate. As discussed above, introducing time trends reduces substantially the
elasticity (from 1.6 with no controls) to about 0.6-0.7 (with many controls). After adding linear
and square controls in time, the adjusted R-square reaches 98% and the elasticity coeﬃcient is
not sensitive to adding further controls. The IV estimates are very close in magnitude to the
OLS estimates and have a strong ﬁrst stage (except in the case of col. (4) where the ﬁrst stage is
weak), suggesting that the issue of reverse causality because of the progressive nature of the tax
schedule is not an important issue. Figure 3 illustrates those issues by plotting, along with the
top 1% income share series, the ﬁtted values from the regressions with no time controls (dotted
line) and with two time controls (solid line). The dotted line shows that the pure tax eﬀects
explain quite poorly the evolution of the top 1% income share. In contrast, the solid line with
two time trends captures extremely well the pattern of the top 1% income share (the adjusted
R-square of the regression is 98%). The dashed line in Figure 3 displays the counterfactual
pattern assuming that the marginal tax rate for the top 1% had remained constant since 1960.
This curve shows that most of growth in the top 1% income share is due to the time trends and
that only 2 out of the 9 percentage point increase in the top 1% income share from the 1960s
to 2000 is due to the decline in marginal tax rates. Therefore in summary, attributing all the
increase in the top income shares to the tax developments generate very large elasticities but ﬁts
the data poorly. Controlling for time trends ﬁts the data much better and reduces substantially
the elasticity as well as the fraction of the increase in top incomes that can be attributed to tax
23changes.
Figure 4 displays the share of income accruing to the bottom half of the top decile (Panel A),
and the bottom half of the top percentile (Panel B), along with the average marginal tax rate
faced by those two groups. The ﬁgure shows that the top 10-5% income group has experienced
very moderate gains since 1960 and the pattern of the gains does not appear to be correlated
with the pattern of the marginal tax rates they face (rising up to 1981, then declining in the
1980s, and then stable in the 1990s). Panels A and B in Table 4 show that regressing the log
of the top income shares of the top 10-5% and top 5-1% on their log net-of-tax rates, with or
without time trend controls produces elasticities very close to zero. Therefore, upper middle
income families and individuals (up to the top 1% threshold around $280,000 per year in 2000)
do not appear to be sensitive to taxation.38 It is striking, in particular, that those upper middle
income class shares increase very little during the 1980s although they experience quite sizeable
marginal tax rate cuts (about 9 percentage points for the top 10-5%, and over 13 points for the
top 5-1%).39 Note again that IV estimates are also virtually identical to OLS estimates.
Interestingly, Panel B of Figure 4 shows that the top 1-.5% share does not decrease during
the 1970s when the marginal tax rate increases from 40 to 50% and does not increase during
ERTA 1981 when the marginal tax rate decreases back to 40%. In contrast, TRA 1986, which
decreases the rate to around 32% (thus a smaller percentage change in the net-of-tax rate relative
to the 1970s or ERTA 1981) does produce a sizeable increase in the income share, producing
a noticeable break in the series. The increase in tax rates to about 38% following OBRA 1992
does not seem to have aﬀected the upward trend following TRA 1986. Thus although marginal
tax rates in the late 1990s are about the same as in the 1960s, the income share is 30% larger.40
38In principle, the secondary earner labor supply responses should be captured by those elasticities. Thus our
results can be consistent with the large married women labor supply responses obtained by Eissa (1995) only if
secondary earners income is a small fraction of total reported family incomes.
39A similar regression analysis for other income groups below the top decile generates small or even negative and
always insigniﬁcant elasticities. The estimates, however, are not very precisely estimated as changes in net-of-tax
rates are much smaller below the top decile.
40Those considerations show again that elasticity estimates would be extremely sensitive to the time period
considered. The ERTA 1981 and OBRA 1993 episodes would produce zero elasticity estimates, and TRA 1986
would produce a sizeable 0.93 estimate (comparing 1986 and 1988). Comparing 2000 to 1984 and attributing all
the large increase in the share to the modest decrease in marginal tax rate would produce an enormous elasticity
24The regressions for the groups top 1-.5% and top .5-.1% in Table 4 (Panels C and D) display
signiﬁcant elasticities but the size of the elasticity is much smaller when income controls are
included.
Figure 5 displays the share of income and marginal tax rates for the very top groups: top
.1-.01% (Panel A), and the top .01% (Panel B). The responses to ERTA 1981, TRA 1986, and
the short-term response to OBRA 1993 followed by a surge in income shares since 1995, are
even more pronounced than for the groups just below. However, the Kennedy tax cuts of the
early 1960s provide striking new evidence. For the very top .01%, the very progressive tax
structure of the early 1960s generated extremely high marginal tax rates (around 80%) which
were reduced signiﬁcantly by the Kennedy tax cuts in 1964-5 (to about 65%).41 This implies a
75% increase in the net-of-tax rate, a much larger increase than the ERTA 1981 and TRA 1986
tax rate reductions. In spite of this enormous marginal tax rate cut, the very top share remains
ﬂat in the 1960s, and well into the 1970s, suggesting a complete absence of behavioral response
in both the short and the long-run.42 Note that, although the top nominal marginal tax rate
was 91%, the average marginal tax rate of the top .01% is “only” slightly above 80%. This is due
to various other provisions of the tax code such as the maximum average tax of 87% on income
and charitable gifts by the very wealthy.43 Table 4 (Panels E and F) show that the regressions
for the top .1-.01% and the top .01% display signiﬁcant elasticities is all speciﬁcations, although
pure tax factors can only explain a fraction of the total increase in the very top shares once
exogenous time trends are included.
estimate of 4.94.
41Those tax cuts were proposed by president Kennedy in the early 1960s but were actually implemented by the
Johnson administration after Kennedy’s death in 1963.
42Lindsey (1990) claimed that the Kennedy tax cuts generated a surge in top incomes, but this erroneous result
is due to his very casual examination of the tabulations published by the IRS. Goolsbee (1999) makes a more
careful use of the same published data (although he does not exclude realized capital gains and does not measure
marginal tax rates very accurately) and ﬁnds no response, as we do here.
43Considering smaller groups at the very top, such as the top .001%, never generates marginal tax rates higher
than 80-82%.
253.3 Composition
We have seen in the previous subsection that the income groups within the top decile display very
heterogeneous responses. Groups below the top 1% never display evidence of tax responsiveness.
Top groups display a sharp response to the 1980s tax cuts, and especially TRA 1986, but only
a short-term response to the tax increase of 1993, and no response for the earlier tax cuts in
the 1960s. In order to cast further light on these ﬁndings, we now turn to an analysis of the
composition of those incomes.44 The complete composition series of top income groups are
reported in Tables D1 and D2 of the longer working paper version Saez (2004).
Figure 6 displays the evolution of the top decile income share, and how those incomes are
decomposed into the seven sources described in Section 2, from 1960 to 2000. Wage income
forms the majority of the top 10% incomes, and its share has increased smoothly from two
thirds to about three quarters since 1960. Interesting, the large 12 percentage point gain in the
top 10% income share (from 32% to 44%) is due almost entirely to a smooth and secular increase
in the wage component (from 22 points to 33.5 points), with the size of the other components
remaining stable overall (around 10 points with a squeeze around 7 points in the late 1970s and
early 1980s).
As depicted in Figure 7, the top 1% income share increases from 8.3% to almost 17% from
1960 to 2000. The striking feature, however, is that 7 out of the 8.7 point increase in the top
1% share is due to the wage income component. As a result, although wages represented only
40% of total income of the top 1% in the early 1960s, they now represent over 60% of top 1%
incomes. The increase in the wage component appears to have started in the early 1970s and
has been fairly regular with an acceleration in the last two decades (especially the 1990s). There
are two spikes in the wage component series, one in 1988 (just after TRA 1986), and another in
1992 (just before the OBRA 1993 tax increase). However, the short-term nature of those two
spikes suggests that they were the consequence of re-timing of wage income to take advantage
of lower rates.45
44The previous literature has mostly focused on taxable income elasticities. Feenberg and Poterba (1993,2000)
analyze the composition of incomes for the top .5% from 1951 to 1990 and Slemrod (1994,1996) analyze the
composition of top incomes around TRA 1986.
45Goolsbee (2000a) showed that executives exercised massively their stock-options in 1992 in order to take
advantage of the low rate of 31% in 1992 before the increase to 39.6% in 1993. This retiming explains the large
26Although the non-wage part stays stable as a whole, the components display interesting pat-
terns. The most striking feature is the emergence of S-corporation income after TRA 1986. Be-
fore the 1980s, S-corporation income was extremely small, as indeed the standard C-corporation
form was more advantageous for high income individual owners because the top individual tax
rate was much higher than the corporate tax rate and taxes on capital gains were relatively low.
S-corporation income increases sharply from 1986 to 1988 and increases slowly afterwards. The
sharp increase in S-corporation income just after TRA 1986 certainly reﬂects in large part a
shift in the status of corporations from C to S status to take advantage of the lower individual
rates.46 In contrast, dividends (paid out by C-corporations and foreign corporations) and sole
proprietorship income decrease regularly over the period. Partnership income is about the same
in the 1960s as in the 1990s; partnership income was very small during the 1980s due to dramatic
increase in partnership losses.47 The dramatic increase of partnership losses from the mid to
late 1970s up to 1986 (during recessions and recoveries alike) is probably ﬁrst due to the increase
in inﬂation which, because of deductibility of nominal interest payments, might have increased
losses.48 Then, taxpayers and tax accountants might have realized that partnerships oﬀered an
attractive possibility to avoid taxes. The repeal of the investment tax credit and the passive
losses limitations with the TRA 1986, as well as the reduction in top tax rates, has drastically
reduced the value of those tax shelters and probably explains the very quick and sustained
disappearance of most partnership losses just after TRA 1986.49 Sole proprietorship income
also displays a similar pattern, with a sharp reduction from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s.50
Although the wage income component starts to increase in the early 1970s, the combined eﬀect
of sharp reductions in partnership and sole proprietorship incomes from the mid-1970s to 1981
income explains why the top 1% income share stays almost ﬂat up to 1981.
Figure 8 displays the income share and composition of the very top .01% group. It shows a
diﬀerence between the short-term and long term elasticity estimates using the OBRA 1993 reform.
46See Slemrod (1996), Carroll and Joulfaian (1997), and Gordon and Slemrod (2000) for a more precise analysis.
47Partnership proﬁts have stayed about stable over the full period.
48Note that interest income (which is not net of interest payment deductions) is particularly high during that
period as well.
49See Samwick (1996) for a more detailed analysis.
50Sole proprietorship income displays a secular trend downward from 1960 to 2000, most likely due to the secular
decline in farming, and other traditional small business activities organized in the form of sole proprietorships.
27dramatic shift in the composition of very top incomes away from dividends (which represented
more than 60% of top incomes in the early 1960s) toward wage income (which represents about
60% of top incomes in 2000).51 In the early 1960s, the top .01% incomes were facing extremely
high marginal tax rates of about 80% on average (while tax rates on long-term capital gains were
around 25%). Thus, dividends were a very disadvantaged form of income for the rich suggesting
that those top income earners had little control over the form of payment, and thus might have
been in large part passive investors. The Kennedy tax cuts did not reduce the top individual
rate enough (the top rate became 70%) to make the S-corporation form attractive relative
to the C-corporation form, explaining perhaps the contrast in behavioral responses between
the Kennedy tax cuts episodes and the tax changes of the 1980s. This shows, as argued by
Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), that the elasticity of reported incomes is not a constant parameter
but may be extremely sensitive to the legal structure, and the complete tax environment for
corporations and individuals. The share of dividends falls regularly over the period while the
share of wage income starts to increase in 1971. By 1979, the wage component overtakes the
dividend component. Figure 8 shows clearly that ERTA 1981 produced a sudden burst of S-
corporation income (which was negligible up to 1981). This is most likely due to a shift from
C-corporations to S-corporations.52 It is interesting to note that the increase in S-corporation
income is concentrated mostly in the top .01% and does not happen at all for groups below the
top .1%. This is fully consistent with the tax minimization explanation: ERTA 1981 decreased
marginal tax rates signiﬁcantly only for groups above the top .1% for whom the subchapter S
status started to become attractive when the top individual rate was reduced to 50%.53 Figure 8
shows that almost all the increase in top incomes from 1981 to 1984, ﬁrst documented by Lindsey
(1987), is also due to the surge in S-corporation income. The wage component increases as well
but with no noticeable break in the upward trend around ERTA 1981.54 The S-corporation
component increases again sharply from 1986 to 1988, and then stay about stable afterwards.
51This secular shift from rentiers to the working rich at the top of the U.S. income distribution is described in
more detail in Piketty and Saez (2003).
52As discussed above, this phenomenon has been well documented in the case of TRA 1986.
53From 1980 to 1986, the corporate tax rate was 42%.
54Because of the maximum tax of 50% on labor income enacted in 1971-2, marginal tax rates for top wage
incomes actually did not change much with ERTA, see below.
28The wage component also presents a spike in 1988, as well as in 1993, but those spikes seem to be
short-term responses in a generally upward trending curve. The tax cuts of the 1960s, although
extremely large, did not generate any behavioral response, perhaps because top individual rates
remained substantially higher than the corporate and capital gains tax rate and thus did not
induce top taxpayers to switch corporate income toward individual income.
Therefore, to sum up, the dramatic increase in top income shares is due primarily to a
secular increase in the wage income component starting in the early 1970s, and the large tax
changes of TRA 1986 and OBRA 1993 seem to have only generated short-term spikes in the
overall upward and accelerating trend of the wage component.55 The tax cuts of the 1980s
have generated a surge in business income taxed at the individual level. ERTA 1981 created a
surge in S-corporation income for the very top groups of the income distribution. With TRA
1986, S-corporation income surged for all upper income groups. Partnership income also rose
dramatically immediately after TRA 1986, mostly because of the disappearance of partnership
losses. Those business income components have remained relatively stable after TRA 1986,
suggesting that they were the consequence of a one-time shift from the corporate sector, and the
one-time closing of the partnership loss tax shelters. The top tax rate increase of 1993 to 39.6%
(with a corporate tax rate of 35%) was not large enough to induce business owners to switch back
to the C-corporation status. As a result, OBRA 1993 did not produce any long term income
shifting away from the individual sector and its only eﬀect seem to have been a short-term
re-timing of salary income. The surge in business income reported on individual returns in the
1980s cannot be interpreted as a “supply-side” success as most of those individual income gains
came either at the expense of taxable corporate income, or could have been obtained from the
closing of tax-shelters by imposing stricter rules on losses from passive businesses.56 Therefore,
success or failure of the tax cuts to generate additional economic activity must be deferred to a
55Top income shares are ﬂat before 1981 masking the increase in the wage component, because of a large
decline in partnership and sole proprietorship income due perhaps to high interest rates and the development of
tax shelters in the 1970s. Partnership income (and to a lesser extent sole proprietorship income), increased back
to its early 1970s level immediately after TRA 1986.
56It is doubtful that the decrease in tax rates, by reducing the incentives to avoid taxes, was necessary to
eliminate abusive partnership losses (as argued for example in Samwick, 1996) because partnership losses were
almost non-existent before the late 1970s, a time where tax rates were extremely high.
29more precise analysis of the central wage income component, to which we now turn.
3.4 Top Wage Incomes
We have seen that most of the increase in top income shares since the 1970s is actually due to a
sharp increase in the wage income component. The time pattern of marginal tax rates for wage
income is not the same as the pattern for other forms of income because of the introduction of
the maximum tax rate on earned income in 1971 which reduced the top rate for earned income
from 70% (the top rate on other income) to 60% in 1971 and then 50% starting in 1972.57 This
provision became irrelevant in 1982 when the top tax rate for any income source was reduced
from 70% to 50%. Therefore, it is of particular interest to analyze separately the wage income
component. All our top wage income share series and corresponding average marginal tax rates
for wage income are reported in Tables C1 and C2 respectively.
As for average income, the evolution of average real wage income series (for the full pop-
ulation) does not appear to be correlated with the evolution of marginal tax rates. Figure 9
shows the pattern of real incomes and marginal tax rates for the bottom 99% wage earners
(Panel A) and the top 1% wage earners (Panel B). The bottom 99% experienced no real growth
in wage income since 1972, and the pattern of changes in real wages does not seem to be re-
lated to changes in marginal tax rates. In contrast, top 1% wage income earners experienced
accelerating growth over the 1960 to 2000 period, with almost a tripling in real wage income
since the early 1970s. Consistent with the pattern of the wage component for overall income,
top wage incomes experienced spikes just after TRA 1986 and just before OBRA 1993, clear
evidence of short-term responses (or re-timing) of labor income compensation. However, the
long-run pattern seems to be an extraordinary and accelerating growth independent of the tax
developments, as marginal tax rates on those wage income earners were about the same, around
40%, in the mid 1960s and in the most recent years. Indeed, the secular growth in top wages
starts in the early 1970s, a time when marginal tax rates were actually increasing (due mostly
to bracket creep). To understand better this unprecedented increase in top wage incomes, it is
useful to consider smaller groups within the top 1% as we did for overall income.
57As described in Slemrod (1994), due to the interaction of this provision with the regular schedule, the marginal
income tax rate on labor income could be higher than those limits in a number of cases.
30Table 5 produces the same regressions as Table 4 but for wage incomes instead of overall
income.58 The shares of the bottom groups of the top decile below the top 1% (top 10-5% and
top 5-1%) display very low elasticities, while all groups within the top 1% display signiﬁcant
elasticities when no time trend is included, increasing sharply from 0.3 to 2.5 as we move up
the wage income distribution. This is because all the increase in the top wage income shares
is attributed to the secular decline in marginal tax rates since the 1960s. Including two time
trends reduces signiﬁcantly the estimated elasticities which are below 0.4 except for the very top
groups. Even within the top 0.1%, where elasticities are sizeable, tax changes can only explain
a very small fraction of the dramatic surge in top wage incomes.
They key point to resolve is whether we should attribute the long-term increase in top wage
shares entirely to the long-term decrease in marginal tax rates. Comparing 1960 and 2000,
that seems to be an untenable view for groups below the top .1% because those groups faced
comparable marginal tax rates in 1960 and in 2000. As a result, the sizeable increase in the top
1-.5% and top .5-.1% wage income shares cannot be due entirely to marginal tax rates.
The problem is more complicated for the very top groups (within the top .1%) because those
groups experienced much larger gains but also experienced a non trivial decline in marginal tax
rates. Undoubtedly, a reason for the huge increase in top wage income shares (the top .01% share
increased more than ten-fold from .21% in 1970 to 2.45% in 2000) has been the development of
stock-options. Stock-options also create lumpiness in wage compensation as they are exercised
by executives only once every few years. As a result, the top .01% might be extremely large
in recent years because, in any given year, very top wage earners are executives who happen
to exercise their stock-options in that particular year. The stock-option phenomenon, however,
has clearly increased the average compensation of top executives as the top 1%, which certainly
includes virtually all the top employees receiving large option grants, even when they do not
exercise stock-options, more than doubles from 5.1% to 12.6% from 1970 to 2000.
Thus, the extraordinary increase in top wage incomes, a phenomenon certainly closely related
to the explosion of the compensation of CEOs and other top executives, sports, movies, and
television stars, appears too large to have been solely the direct consequence of the tax reductions
58We have omitted the IV estimates in the case of wages because the ﬁrst stage is not as strong as in the case
of income and the estimates are more noisy.
31through supply-side eﬀects. Furthermore, the surge in top wages is not related closely enough
to the timing of the tax cuts to suggest a direct and simple causal link. Particularly surprising
is the surge in top wages since 1994, in spite of the signiﬁcant tax increase in 1993, which makes
the secular reduction in marginal tax rates faced by top wage groups appear rather small.59
A more pertinent question to ask is perhaps whether this surge in top wages could have
occurred, had the tax structure remained the same as in the early 1960s, and the working rich
had to pay in taxes more than three quarters of their compensation. It is plausible to think that
the drastic reduction in top marginal tax rates, which started in the 1960s, opened the possibility
of the dramatic increase in top wages that started in the 1970s, and accelerated in the 1980s
and the 1990s. It is of course impossible to provide a convincing answer to that important
question by looking only at individual income tax statistics in the United States. A promising
way to make progress would be look more closely into the top salaries surge phenomenon by
analyzing executive compensation data. There is a large literature on executive compensation
(see Murphy, 1999 for a survey). However, although there are many studies explaining disparity
of CEO pay in cross-sectional data, no convincing explanation for the time series evidence seems
to have been provided.60 If the dramatic surge in top compensation is not fully explained by a
comparable surge in the marginal productivity of top executives, then this is evidence of a market
failure which would certainly change the welfare and tax policy analysis that we presented above.
Alternatively, top executive pay may now be aligned to marginal product and was below market
value before. We note, however, that the surge in the top 1% salaries since the early 1970s has
been accompanied with a dismal growth for the bottom 99% salary earners, and thus does not
seem to have had a positive impact on the vast majority of working families. An alternative
way to make progress in our understanding is by looking at other countries experiences, a point
to which we now turn for our conclusion.
59Companies, however, might have started granting stock-options more aggressively after TRA 1986 because
of the decrease in individual tax rates. Those options can be exercised (and thus appear on individual income
tax returns) only a number of years later. Hall and Murphy (2003) show, however, that grants of stock-options,
valued using the Black-Scholes formula, increased massively after the tax increase of 1993.
60It is quite telling to read in the recent survey of Hall and Murphy (2003), two prominent and conservative
researchers in this ﬁeld, that their best explanation for the surge in stock-option compensation was that “boards
and managers falsely perceive stock options to be inexpensive because of accounting and cash-ﬂow considerations”.
324 Conclusion: International Comparisons
Unfortunately, no other country oﬀers such a large body of empirical analysis on behavioral
responses to individual income taxation than the United States. Recently, however, a number of
studies have produced series of top income shares using tax return data. Although, those studies
do not produce corresponding series of marginal tax rates, as we have done here, interesting
ﬁndings emerge.
First, there is enormous heterogeneity in the behavior of top income shares in the recent
decades across countries. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom (Atkinson, 2002) or
Canada (Saez and Veall, 2003) have experienced notable increases in top income shares, although
those increases have not been as pronounced as in the United States. In contrast, countries from
continental Europe such as France (Piketty, 2001), the Netherlands (Atkinson and Salverda,
2003), or Switzerland (Dell, Piketty, and Saez, 2003) have experienced either declines or little
changes in top income shares since the 1960.
Second, the United Kingdom experience seems to be the closest to the U.S. experience.
Top income shares in the United Kingdom started increasing exactly in 1979 when the top
rate declined from 98% to 75%, although this increase seems modest relative to size of net-
of-tax increase at the top.61 In 1988, the top rate was further decreased to 40% and has not
changed since then. In contrast to the United States however, the increase in top share has been
relatively smooth since 1979 with no break around the tax changes. Studying the composition,
and estimating precisely the marginal tax rates faced by top U.K. incomes seems to be a priority
to understand whether the recent increase in top incomes is due to the tax developments.62
Third, Canada has experienced a surge in top incomes signiﬁcantly larger than the United
Kingdom (although smaller than the United States), and as in the United States, this increase
has been due to a dramatic increase in top salaries since the early 1980s. However, in contrast
to the United States, top incomes in Canada have not experienced, very large tax cuts since the
1960s.63 Thus, the dramatic increase in top incomes in Canada cannot be attributed solely to
61It might be the case, however, that for the top .1% incomes, the average decline in marginal tax rates has
been much more modest.
62Dilnot and Kell (1988) try to analyze this issue but have only access to a single year of micro-tax returns and
have to rely on aggregate numbers for their time series analysis.
63The top income tax rate in Canada, including provincial taxes, is about 50% in 2000.
33ﬁscal developments in Canada. Saez and Veall (2003) argue that the threat of emigration toward
the United States have forced Canadian companies to increase the pay of their top employees to
retain them, thereby replicating in Canada the dramatic U.S. increase in top employees’ pay. If
the migration threat explanation is correct, it implies that the surge in top wage incomes in the
United States is a real phenomenon and not uniquely a consequence of repackaging of income
in order to avoid taxes.
Last, in contrast to the United States and the United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, and
Switzerland have experienced relatively small changes in their top tax rates. Piketty (1999)
shows that the small changes in the French top tax rates generated small short-term responses
of top incomes but that those responses do not seem to persist overtime. Switzerland has lower
top income tax rates than the United States (around 35% when adding federal, cantonal, and
local income taxes), but has much lower top income shares than the United States (the top 1%
share is around 8-9% in the 1990s, while it is between 13 and 17% in the United States).
In sum, high income tax rates do not seem to be able to account for the diﬀerences in
top income shares across countries, although it is more debatable whether they can account
for a substantial part of the time series pattern within countries. Therefore, it would be of
most interest to make a systematic analysis of top incomes in countries which have experienced
drastic cuts in top income tax rates in the recent decades, as in the United States and the
United Kingdom. Those results could teach us whether a dramatic cut in top rates is necessarily
associated with a rise in top incomes.
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Marginal Tax Rates and Average Real Incomes for the Bottom 99% and the Top 1%
Source: Series obtained from Tables A and B1 
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Marginal Tax Rate Average IncomeFIGURE 3.
Tax Rates and Income Shares for the Medium-High Income Groups
Source: Series obtained from Tables B1 and B2 




































































































































Marginal Tax Rate Income Share
































































































































Marginal Tax Rate Income ShareFIGURE 4.
Tax Rates and Income Shares for the Very Top Groups
Source: Series obtained from Tables B1 and B2 
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Marginal Tax Rate Income ShareFIGURE 5.
The Top 1% Income Share and fitted Values from Elasticity Regressions
Source: Series based on regression analysis presented in Table 3, columns (1) and (5).
The diamond line is the top 1% income share. The dotted line is the fitted regression curve
including only the net-of-tax rate. The solid line is the fitted regression curve including time controls.












































































































The Top 10% Income Share and Composition, 1960-2000
Source: Tables B1 and Table D1 in the working paper version Saez (2004).
The figure displays the income share of the top 10% tax units, and how the top 10% incomes are  
divided into seven income components: wages and salaries (including exercised stock options), 

































































































Wages S-Corp. Partner. Sole P. Dividends Interest OtherFIGURE 7.
The Top 1% Income Share and Composition, 1960-2000
Source: Tables B1 and Table D1 in the working paper version Saez (2004).
The figure displays the income share of the top 1% tax units, and how the top 1% incomes are  
divided into seven income components: wages and salaries (including exercised stock options), 
































































































Wages S-Corp. Partner. Sole P. Dividends Interest OtherFIGURE 8.
The Top 0.01% Income Share and Composition, 1960-2000
Source: Tables B1 and Table D1 in the working paper version Saez (2004).
The figure displays the income share of the top .01% tax units, and how the top .01% incomes are  
divided into seven income components: wages and salaries (including exercised stock options), 






























































































Wages S-Corp. Partner. Sole P. Dividends Interest OtherFIGURE 9.
Marginal Tax Rates and Average Real Wage Incomes for the Bottom 99% and the Top 1%
Source: Series obtained from Tables A, C1, and C2.
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Number of tax 
units
Average 
income in each 
group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Population 133,589,000 $42,709
Median $25,076 Bottom 90% 120,230,100 $26,616
Top 10%  $87,334 Top 10-5% 6,679,450 $100,480
Top 5% $120,212 Top 5-1% 5,343,560 $162,366
Top 1% $277,983 Top 1-0.5% 667,945 $327,970
Top .5% $397,949 Top 0.5-0.1% 534,356 $611,848
Top .1% $1,134,849 Top 0.1-0.01% 120,230 $2,047,801
Top .01% $5,349,795 Top 0.01% 13,359 $13,055,242
Notes: Computations based on income tax return statistics. 
Income defined as annual gross income reported on tax returns excluding capital gains and all government transfers 
(such as Social Security, Unemployment Benefits, Welfare Payments, etc.) and before individual income taxes and 
employees' payroll taxes. Amounts are expressed in current 2000 dollars. 
Column (2) reports the income thresholds corresponding to each of the percentiles in column (1). For example,
an annual income of at least $87,334 is required to belong to the top 10% tax units, etc.
Thresholds and Average Incomes in Top Income Groups in 2000TABLE 2.
Elasticities of income wrt net-of-tax rates in the Aggregate, Bottom 99%, and Top 1%
Regression Regression Regression
in Levels in Levels + in Levels +
Time ControlTime Controls
(1) (2) (3)
PANEL A. All tax units
Elasticity -0.44 -0.02 0.20
(0.84) (0.38) (0.55)
Time Trend YES YES
Time Trend Square YES
PANEL B. Bottom 99% tax units
Elasticity -0.66 -0.41 -0.04
(0.70) (0.37) (0.38)
Time Trend YES YES
Time Trend Square YES
PANEL C. Top 1% tax units 
Elasticity 1.83 0.71 0.50
(0.37) (0.22) (0.18)
Time Trend YES YES
Time Trend Square YES
Notes: Estimates obtained by time-series regression of log(average real income) (using CPI-U deflator)
on a constant, log (1 - average marginal tax rate) from 1960 to 2000 (38 observations).
In column 1,  simple OLS regression is run, Standard Errors from Newey-West with 8 lags.
In column 2, a time trend is added. In column 3, time^2 trend is added.TABLE 3.
Elasticities of the top 1% income share with respect to net-of-tax rates
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(Newey-West (Top Rate  (Newey-West (Top Rate  (Newey-West (Top Rate  (Newey-West (Top Rate 
s.e.) Instrument) s.e.) Instrument) s.e.) Instrument) s.e.) Instrument)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Elasticity 1.58 1.70 0.85 -0.02 0.62 0.59 0.68 0.61
(0.28) (0.19) (0.21) (0.34) (0.12) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09)
Time Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Trend Square YES YES YES YES
Time Trend Cube YES YES
Adjusted R-Square 0.72 0.71 0.86 0.74 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
First Stage t-statistics 10.10 5.37 10.1 11.7
Notes: Estimates obtained by time-series regression of log(top 1% income share) 
on a constant, log (1 - average marginal tax rate), and polynomials time controls from 1960 to 2000 (38 observations).
In columns 1, 3, 5, and 7, simple OLS regression is run, Standard Errors from Newey-West with 8 lags.
In columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, 2SLS regression is run using log(1- top marginal tax rate) as an instrument.TABLE 4.
Elasticities of income shares wrt net-of-tax rates for various upper income groups
Newey-West Newey-West 2SLS Newey-West Newey-West 2SLS
OLS Regression OLS Regression Regression OLS Regression OLS Regression Regression
no time controls with time controlswith time controls no time controls with time controlswith time controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Top Income Groups B. Intermediate Income Groups
Top 10% Top 10-5%
Elasticity 0.77 0.33 0.32 -0.44 -0.11 -0.04
(0.36) (0.08) (0.05) (0.17) (0.09) (0.10)
First-Stage t-stat. of instrument 9.94 6.5
Top 5% Top 5-1%
Elasticity 1.25 0.43 0.39 0.14 0.12 0.09
(0.30) (0.09) (0.05) (0.28) (0.04) (0.04)
First-Stage t-stat. of instrument 10.5 8.16
Top 1% Top 1-.5%
Elasticity 1.58 0.62 0.59 0.92 0.30 0.29
(0.28) (0.12) (0.08) (0.21) (0.08) (0.07)
First-Stage t-stat. of instrument 10.11 10.65
Top 0.5% Top 0.5-0.1%
Elasticity 1.55 0.72 0.69 1.21 0.52 0.49
(0.25) (0.13) (0.09) (0.22) (0.09) (0.08)
First-Stage t-stat. of instrument 9.9 9.21
Top 0.1% Top 0.1-0.01%
Elasticity 1.54 0.94 0.89 1.44 0.78 0.76
(0.27) (0.19) (0.11) (0.23) (0.16) (0.11)
First-Stage t-stat. of instrument 11.37 9.69
Top 0.01% Top 0.01%
Elasticity 1.45 1.08 1.09 1.45 1.08 1.09
(0.36) (0.32) (0.16) (0.36) (0.32) (0.16)
First-Stage t-stat. of instrument 18.01 18.01
Notes: Estimates obtained by time-series regression of log(top income share)
on a constant, log (1 - average marginal tax rate), time trend, and square of time trend from 1960 to 2000 (38 observations).
In columns 1 and 4,  OLS regression is run, no time trend included. Newey-West standard errors with 8 lags reported.
In columns 2 and 5,  OLS regression is run with time and time^2 trend included. Newey-West standard errors with 8 lags reported.
In columns 3 and 6,  2SLS regression is run with time and time^2 trend included and instrumented with log (1- top marginal tax rate).TABLE 5.
Elasticities of wage income shares wrt net-of-tax rates for various upper wage income groups
Newey-West Newey-West Newey-West Newey-West
OLS Regression OLS Regression OLS Regression OLS Regression
no time controls with time controls no time controls with time controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Top Wage Income Groups B. Intermediate Groups
Top 10% Top 10-5%
Elasticity -0.10 0.10 -0.43 -0.05
(0.55) (0.07) (0.18) (0.02)
Top 5% Top 5-1%
Elasticity 0.41 0.17 -0.17 0.07
(0.56) (0.09) (0.37) (0.02)
Top 1% Top 1-.5%
Elasticity 1.97 0.39 0.31 0.15
(0.45) (0.12) (0.48) (0.05)
Top 0.5% Top 0.5-0.1%
Elasticity 2.33 0.51 1.50 0.38
(0.54) (0.13) (0.32) (0.08)
Top 0.1% Top 0.1-0.01%
Elasticity 2.44 0.82 2.16 0.72
(0.43) (0.17) (0.37) (0.11)
Top 0.01% Top 0.01%
Elasticity 2.48 0.96 2.48 0.96
(0.50) (0.42) (0.50) (0.42)
Notes: Estimates obtained by time-series regression of log(top wage income share)
on a constant, log (1 - average marginal tax rate), time trend, and square of time trend from 1960 to 2000 (38 obs.)
In columns 1 and 3,  OLS regression is run, no time trends included. Newey-West standard errors with 8 lags reported.
In columns 2 and 4,  OLS regression is run with time and time^2 trend included. Newey-West standard errors with 
8 lags reported.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Tax Units Number of (2)/(1) Population (4)/(1) Total income Average income Average Marginal  Tax Units with Total Wages Average Wages Average Marginal  CPI-U CPI-U-RS
tax returns (%) (millions 2000 $(2000 $, CPI-U) Tax Rate (%) Wages (millions 2000 $,(2000 $, CPI-U) Tax Rate (%) (2000 base) (2000 base)
('000s) ('000s) ('000s) CPI-U) CPI-U)
1960 68,681 61,028 88.9 180,671 2.63 1,850,218 26,939 22.55 52,554 1,587,214 30,201 22.68 17.189 20.183
1961 69,997 61,499 87.9 183,691 2.62 1,907,985 27,258 51,946 1,615,622 31,102 17.361 20.385
1962 71,254 62,712 88.0 186,538 2.62 2,011,233 28,226 23.32 53,338 1,705,361 31,972 23.35 17.552 20.609
1963 72,464 63,943 88.2 189,242 2.61 2,099,285 28,970 53,893 1,772,347 32,886 17.762 20.856
1964 73,660 65,376 88.8 191,889 2.61 2,236,911 30,368 21.64 55,216 1,877,056 33,995 21.66 17.993 21.127
1965 74,772 67,596 90.4 194,303 2.60 2,361,753 31,586 57,239 1,987,572 34,724 18.299 21.486
1966 75,831 70,160 92.5 196,560 2.59 2,500,162 32,970 21.30 60,358 2,125,707 35,219 21.19 18.830 22.110
1967 76,856 71,652 93.2 198,712 2.59 2,600,178 33,832 21.62 61,571 2,213,824 35,955 21.59 19.376 22.751
1968 77,826 73,729 94.7 200,706 2.58 2,719,064 34,938 24.33 62,836 2,337,364 37,198 24.10 20.190 23.662
1969 78,793 75,834 96.2 202,677 2.57 2,794,675 35,469 25.53 64,371 2,435,448 37,834 25.15 21.280 24.693
1970 79,924 74,280 92.9 205,052 2.57 2,845,542 35,603 24.11 63,778 2,447,144 38,370 24.20 22.535 25.882
1971 81,849 74,576 91.1 207,661 2.54 2,905,636 35,500 23.06 63,194 2,484,179 39,311 23.29 23.527 27.031
1972 83,670 77,573 92.7 209,896 2.51 3,093,721 36,975 23.62 64,750 2,630,468 40,625 23.73 24.280 27.864
1973 85,442 80,693 94.4 211,909 2.48 3,225,502 37,751 24.77 67,614 2,748,251 40,646 24.68 25.785 29.608
1974 87,228 83,340 95.5 213,854 2.45 3,195,330 36,632 25.82 68,518 2,697,802 39,373 25.61 28.621 32.541
1975 89,127 82,229 92.3 215,973 2.42 3,093,548 34,709 25.40 66,671 2,609,012 39,132 25.91 31.226 35.236
1976 91,048 84,670 93.0 218,035 2.39 3,235,043 35,531 26.04 68,459 2,722,938 39,775 26.53 33.037 37.257
1977 93,076 86,635 93.1 220,239 2.37 3,339,935 35,884 27.71 70,898 2,825,066 39,847 28.33 35.185 39.635
1978 95,213 89,771 94.3 222,585 2.34 3,480,248 36,552 29.16 74,503 2,961,075 39,745 29.87 37.859 41.340
1979 97,457 92,694 95.1 225,055 2.31 3,503,689 35,951 29.19 77,038 2,979,812 38,680 30.04 42.137 45.224
1980 99,625 93,902 94.3 227,726 2.29 3,412,006 34,248 30.66 76,913 2,880,118 37,446 31.77 47.825 50.258
1981 101,432 95,396 94.0 229,966 2.27 3,419,549 33,713 31.68 77,439 2,876,292 37,143 32.95 52.751 54.974
1982 103,250 95,337 92.3 232,188 2.25 3,405,788 32,986 29.22 75,771 2,844,255 37,537 30.71 56.022 58.185
1983 105,067 96,321 91.7 234,307 2.23 3,466,971 32,998 27.36 76,260 2,913,254 38,202 28.90 57.814 60.602
1984 106,871 99,439 93.0 236,348 2.21 3,637,968 34,041 26.99 80,008 3,075,930 38,445 28.36 60.300 63.020
1985 108,736 101,660 93.5 238,466 2.19 3,760,935 34,588 27.27 81,936 3,193,778 38,979 28.59 62.471 65.161
1986 110,684 103,045 93.1 240,651 2.17 3,876,141 35,020 27.26 83,340 3,321,487 39,855 28.77 63.658 66.310
1987 112,640 106,996 95.0 242,804 2.16 4,046,941 35,928 24.47 85,618 3,442,337 40,206 25.98 65.950 68.569
1988 114,656 109,708 95.7 245,021 2.14 4,305,720 37,553 22.92 88,121 3,572,571 40,542 24.75 68.654 71.066
1989 116,759 112,136 96.0 247,342 2.12 4,350,842 37,263 23.06 90,145 3,609,277 40,039 24.65 71.949 74.158
1990 119,055 113,717 95.5 250,132 2.10 4,377,181 36,766 23.05 91,348 3,632,403 39,764 24.77 75.834 77.883
1991 120,453 114,730 95.2 253,493 2.10 4,286,889 35,590 23.11 89,813 3,574,052 39,794 24.61 79.019 80.737
1992 121,944 113,605 93.2 256,894 2.11 4,356,547 35,726 22.99 89,883 3,645,188 40,555 24.91 81.390 82.878
1993 123,378 114,602 92.9 260,255 2.11 4,320,595 35,019 23.94 91,279 3,687,902 40,402 25.60 83.832 85.018
1994 124,716 115,943 93.0 263,436 2.11 4,424,217 35,474 24.29 93,270 3,783,593 40,566 25.82 86.011 86.881
1995 126,023 118,218 93.8 266,557 2.12 4,581,375 36,353 24.58 95,388 3,891,745 40,799 26.29 88.419 89.061
1996 127,625 120,351 94.3 269,667 2.11 4,730,336 37,064 24.75 97,338 3,986,011 40,950 26.65 91.072 91.478
1997 129,301 122,422 94.7 272,912 2.11 4,974,958 38,476 25.33 100,161 4,170,993 41,643 27.32 93.167 93.460
1998 130,945 124,771 95.3 276,115 2.11 5,268,063 40,231 25.56 103,069 4,429,422 42,975 27.79 94.657 94.768
1999 132,267 127,075 96.1 279,295 2.11 5,522,779 41,755 25.84 105,233 4,626,416 43,963 28.39 96.740 96.750
2000 133,589 129,272 96.8 282,339 2.11 5,705,414 42,709 26.13 107,693 4,836,329 44,909 28.99 100.000 100.000
Notes: Population and tax units estimates based on census and current population surveys (Historical Statistics of the United States, and Statistical Abstract of the United States)
Tax units estimated as sum of married men, divorced and widowed men and women, and singles men and women aged 20 and over.
Income defined as Adjusted Gross Income less realized capital gains, taxable SS and UI benefits and adding back all adjustments to gross income. Income of non-filers is imputed as 20% of average income.
Marginal tax rates are weighted by income and estimated using TAXSIM calculator and the tax return micro-files and ignoring interactions with state income taxes.
Marginal income tax rate in column (10) is a weighted average of marginal tax rate on earned income and other income.
Tax units with wages defined as total number of employees (from National Income and Product Accounts) less number of married women employed (from Statistical Abstract of the United States).
Total wages from total compensation of employees from National Income and Product Accounts.
Marginal income tax rate in column (14) is the average (wage income weighted) marginal tax rate on wages and salaries.
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) is the official CPI index from Economic Report of the President. CPI-U-RS includes retrospectively improvements on CPI estimation method for 1967-1998 period.
TABLE A. Reference Totals for Population, Income, and Inflation, 1960-2000
Tax Units and Population Inflation Indexes Total Income  Wage earners and wage income Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top .5% Top .1% Top .01% Top 10-5% Top 5-1% Top 1-.5% Top .5-.1% Top .1-.01% Top .01%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1960 31.70 20.81 8.28 5.53 2.13 0.59 10.89 12.53 2.75 3.40 1.54 0.59
1962 32.37 21.23 8.42 5.59 2.10 0.57 11.14 12.81 2.83 3.49 1.53 0.57
1964 32.18 21.04 8.25 5.46 2.05 0.56 11.14 12.78 2.80 3.41 1.49 0.56
1966 32.01 21.01 8.35 5.56 2.14 0.60 11.00 12.66 2.79 3.42 1.54 0.60
1967 32.12 21.12 8.42 5.61 2.15 0.59 11.00 12.70 2.80 3.47 1.56 0.59
1968 32.06 21.03 8.36 5.58 2.13 0.58 11.02 12.67 2.78 3.44 1.56 0.58
1969 31.86 20.72 8.03 5.30 1.99 0.54 11.14 12.70 2.73 3.31 1.45 0.54
1970 31.59 20.45 7.81 5.15 1.92 0.52 11.14 12.64 2.66 3.22 1.40 0.52
1971 31.82 20.54 7.79 5.11 1.90 0.51 11.28 12.76 2.68 3.21 1.39 0.51
1972 31.70 20.43 7.76 5.09 1.90 0.52 11.27 12.67 2.67 3.19 1.39 0.52
1973 31.93 20.64 7.75 5.06 1.87 0.49 11.29 12.89 2.69 3.19 1.38 0.49
1974 32.47 21.12 8.15 5.41 2.09 0.56 11.35 12.98 2.74 3.32 1.53 0.56
1975 32.74 21.14 8.04 5.32 2.02 0.55 11.61 13.09 2.73 3.29 1.47 0.55
1976 32.56 20.97 7.92 5.23 2.00 0.56 11.59 13.04 2.69 3.23 1.45 0.56
1977 32.60 20.99 7.96 5.27 2.03 0.56 11.60 13.04 2.69 3.24 1.47 0.56
1978 32.63 21.05 8.01 5.32 2.07 0.57 11.59 13.03 2.69 3.25 1.49 0.57
1979 32.53 21.01 8.09 5.40 2.15 0.61 11.52 12.91 2.69 3.26 1.54 0.61
1980 33.05 21.36 8.24 5.53 2.22 0.65 11.69 13.11 2.71 3.31 1.57 0.65
1981 32.96 21.16 8.03 5.38 2.17 0.64 11.80 13.13 2.65 3.21 1.54 0.64
1982 33.81 21.83 8.50 5.79 2.45 0.77 11.99 13.32 2.72 3.34 1.68 0.77
1983 34.37 22.25 8.71 5.99 2.60 0.86 12.12 13.55 2.72 3.39 1.74 0.86
1984 34.54 22.50 8.98 6.26 2.82 0.97 12.03 13.52 2.72 3.44 1.84 0.97
1985 34.86 22.81 9.20 6.44 2.94 0.96 12.05 13.61 2.76 3.50 1.98 0.96
1986 35.20 23.02 9.22 6.41 2.86 0.99 12.18 13.80 2.81 3.55 1.87 0.99
1987 36.68 24.70 10.87 7.83 3.74 1.30 11.98 13.83 3.04 4.09 2.44 1.30
1988 38.85 27.17 13.28 10.02 5.22 1.99 11.68 13.89 3.26 4.80 3.23 1.99
1989 38.70 26.89 12.74 9.45 4.76 1.75 11.82 14.15 3.29 4.69 3.02 1.75
1990 39.12 27.32 13.12 9.79 4.92 1.83 11.81 14.20 3.32 4.88 3.09 1.83
1991 39.00 26.98 12.48 9.12 4.44 1.61 12.02 14.50 3.36 4.68 2.83 1.61
1992 40.36 28.35 13.71 10.25 5.26 2.03 12.01 14.65 3.46 4.99 3.23 2.03
1993 39.99 27.85 13.03 9.58 4.75 1.75 12.14 14.82 3.45 4.83 3.01 1.75
1994 39.93 27.85 13.04 9.57 4.74 1.74 12.08 14.81 3.47 4.82 3.00 1.74
1995 40.54 28.46 13.53 9.99 4.98 1.82 12.08 14.93 3.54 5.00 3.17 1.82
1996 41.14 29.15 14.10 10.48 5.32 1.97 11.99 15.05 3.62 5.16 3.35 1.97
1997 41.70 29.83 14.77 11.12 5.80 2.19 11.87 15.07 3.65 5.31 3.61 2.19
1998 42.06 30.31 15.28 11.60 6.19 2.40 11.74 15.04 3.68 5.41 3.79 2.40
1999 42.59 30.91 15.85 12.14 6.63 2.63 11.68 15.06 3.71 5.51 4.00 2.63
2000 43.91 32.15 16.94 13.10 7.37 3.06 11.76 15.21 3.84 5.73 4.32 3.06
Notes: Computations by authors on tax return statistics. Taxpayers are ranked by gross income (excluding capital gains and government transfers).
Income of non-filers is imputed as 20% of average income. Groups defined relative to all tax units (filers and non-filers).
The Table reports the percentage of total income accruing to each of the top groups. Top 10% denotes to top decile, 
top 10-5% denotes the bottom half of the top decile, etc.
Table B1. Top Income Shares in the United States, 1960-2000Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top .5% Top .1% Top .01% Top 10-5% Top 5-1% Top 1-.5% Top .5-.1% Top .1-.01% Top MTR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1960 32.32 37.33 51.47 57.92 69.89 81.30 22.74 27.98 38.50 50.42 65.55 87
1962 33.17 38.02 51.89 58.05 69.07 79.31 23.92 28.91 39.73 51.41 65.27 87
1964 31.19 35.72 48.43 54.00 62.78 70.43 22.65 27.51 37.54 48.71 59.89 77
1966 30.58 34.91 47.13 52.00 59.90 65.22 22.32 26.85 37.42 47.06 57.84 70
1967 31.05 35.49 47.61 52.29 59.67 64.74 22.53 27.46 38.25 47.72 57.74 70
1968 34.55 39.38 52.37 57.03 64.31 67.44 25.32 30.82 43.03 52.51 63.15 75.25
1969 35.56 40.40 53.37 58.04 65.22 68.62 26.54 32.21 44.30 53.72 63.95 77
1970 34.29 39.05 51.53 55.76 61.87 64.28 25.57 31.34 43.33 52.12 60.98 71.75
1971 33.48 38.30 50.73 54.89 61.06 63.50 24.71 30.72 42.78 51.24 60.16 70
1972 34.55 39.42 51.19 54.48 59.36 61.40 25.72 32.22 44.94 51.57 58.60 70
1973 36.19 41.26 52.37 55.36 60.14 63.22 26.91 34.58 46.74 52.55 59.04 70
1974 37.56 42.73 53.79 56.56 61.20 63.68 27.95 35.78 48.32 53.64 60.30 70
1975 36.53 41.12 51.38 54.52 59.34 61.87 28.18 34.82 45.28 51.55 58.38 70
1976 38.32 43.02 53.10 56.04 60.77 64.36 29.82 36.89 47.39 53.10 59.40 70
1977 40.88 45.90 54.93 56.89 60.12 61.74 31.81 40.39 51.09 54.87 59.50 70
1978 42.65 47.43 55.45 57.37 60.62 62.75 33.96 42.50 51.67 55.30 59.80 70
1979 42.57 47.44 54.99 56.53 58.61 59.90 33.70 42.70 51.91 55.15 58.10 70
1980 44.14 48.46 54.84 56.18 57.79 58.79 36.25 44.46 52.10 55.11 57.37 70
1981 45.01 48.72 54.12 55.20 56.11 56.30 38.36 45.41 51.92 54.59 56.03 70
1982 40.60 43.72 47.44 47.45 46.49 44.90 34.92 41.34 47.44 48.15 47.22 50
1983 38.24 41.27 46.07 47.17 47.48 47.15 32.68 38.18 43.66 46.92 47.65 50
1984 37.33 40.22 44.65 45.72 45.88 46.56 31.92 37.28 42.18 45.59 45.53 50
1985 37.74 40.73 45.53 46.81 47.14 47.16 32.09 37.49 42.54 46.53 47.13 50
1986 37.58 40.52 45.34 46.51 47.31 46.72 32.03 37.30 42.66 45.87 47.62 50
1987 33.88 35.85 37.31 37.07 36.93 36.53 29.82 34.69 37.92 37.21 37.14 38.5
1988 29.03 29.46 28.59 27.53 27.33 27.07 28.05 30.29 31.83 27.76 27.49 28
1989 29.10 29.56 28.50 27.42 27.09 26.99 28.05 30.51 31.60 27.75 27.15 28
1990 29.20 29.74 28.91 27.90 27.65 27.57 27.96 30.50 31.90 28.15 27.70 28
1991 29.93 30.99 32.01 31.50 31.29 31.21 27.57 30.11 33.39 31.70 31.35 31
1992 29.87 30.88 31.83 31.34 31.25 31.15 27.47 30.00 33.29 31.42 31.32 31
1993 32.34 34.38 39.01 39.55 39.99 39.83 27.66 30.31 37.50 39.12 40.08 39.6
1994 32.57 34.61 39.27 39.68 39.95 39.80 27.86 30.51 38.14 39.41 40.04 39.6
1995 32.62 34.60 38.74 38.98 39.51 39.46 27.94 30.86 38.04 38.47 39.53 39.6
1996 32.39 34.17 37.74 37.90 38.42 38.38 28.05 30.83 37.26 37.37 38.44 39.6
1997 33.21 35.21 39.15 39.47 39.48 39.35 28.18 31.35 38.16 39.47 39.55 39.6
1998 33.63 35.54 39.05 39.36 39.43 39.37 28.69 31.98 38.07 39.29 39.47 39.6
1999 33.79 35.78 38.94 39.32 39.32 39.19 28.53 32.45 37.67 39.32 39.41 39.6
2000 33.95 36.02 38.83 39.28 39.21 39.01 28.37 32.93 37.27 39.35 39.35 39.6
Notes: Marginal Tax Rates computed using micro-files of tax returns and the TAXSIM calculator. Marginal tax rates include only federal income taxes and ignore state 
income taxes. Marginal tax rates are weighted by income, and are a weighted average of marginal tax rates on earnings and other income (excluding capital gains).
Column (12) reports the top marginal tax rate. In 1960-1963, the top bracket rate is 91% but there is maximum average tax rate of 87%.
In 1971-1981, the top marginal tax rate for labor income is lower (see Table D2).
Table B2. Marginal Tax Rates for Top Income Groups in the United States, 1960-2000Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top .5% Top .1% Top .01% Top 10-5% Top 5-1% Top 1-.5% Top .5-.1% Top .1-.01% Top .01%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1960 24.64 15.11 5.16 3.30 1.15 0.25 9.53 9.95 1.86 2.15 0.91 0.25
1962 24.62 15.02 5.05 3.21 1.08 0.21 9.60 9.97 1.85 2.13 0.87 0.21
1964 24.98 15.25 5.12 3.24 1.07 0.21 9.73 10.13 1.88 2.17 0.87 0.21
1966 25.35 15.47 5.16 3.27 1.10 0.22 9.88 10.31 1.89 2.16 0.88 0.22
1967 25.78 15.81 5.34 3.38 1.14 0.23 9.97 10.47 1.96 2.24 0.91 0.23
1968 25.60 15.66 5.24 3.32 1.12 0.23 9.94 10.42 1.92 2.20 0.89 0.23
1969 25.71 15.68 5.19 3.27 1.10 0.24 10.04 10.49 1.92 2.17 0.87 0.24
1970 25.67 15.64 5.13 3.21 1.06 0.21 10.03 10.51 1.92 2.15 0.85 0.21
1971 25.67 15.67 5.18 3.25 1.08 0.22 10.00 10.49 1.93 2.17 0.86 0.22
1972 25.82 15.80 5.32 3.39 1.14 0.24 10.02 10.48 1.94 2.24 0.90 0.24
1973 26.15 16.06 5.43 3.43 1.14 0.24 10.09 10.63 2.00 2.28 0.91 0.24
1974 26.63 16.48 5.66 3.63 1.26 0.27 10.15 10.82 2.03 2.37 0.99 0.27
1975 26.46 16.32 5.64 3.63 1.26 0.27 10.15 10.67 2.01 2.38 0.98 0.27
1976 26.66 16.49 5.74 3.70 1.30 0.29 10.16 10.76 2.04 2.40 1.02 0.29
1977 26.94 16.70 5.85 3.79 1.35 0.30 10.25 10.85 2.06 2.45 1.05 0.30
1978 27.43 17.07 6.05 3.93 1.40 0.31 10.36 11.02 2.13 2.53 1.09 0.31
1979 27.65 17.25 6.21 4.06 1.47 0.34 10.40 11.03 2.15 2.59 1.13 0.34
1980 28.06 17.60 6.43 4.23 1.57 0.38 10.46 11.17 2.20 2.66 1.19 0.38
1981 28.15 17.65 6.43 4.24 1.59 0.39 10.50 11.23 2.18 2.66 1.20 0.39
1982 28.56 18.02 6.68 4.42 1.67 0.41 10.54 11.34 2.25 2.75 1.26 0.41
1983 29.09 18.49 6.96 4.66 1.80 0.47 10.61 11.53 2.30 2.86 1.33 0.47
1984 29.61 18.95 7.27 4.96 1.99 0.52 10.66 11.68 2.32 2.97 1.47 0.52
1985 29.74 19.05 7.28 4.92 1.98 0.54 10.70 11.77 2.35 2.95 1.44 0.54
1986 29.94 19.19 7.33 4.96 2.02 0.58 10.75 11.87 2.36 2.95 1.44 0.58
1987 30.60 19.99 8.15 5.69 2.43 0.69 10.61 11.83 2.47 3.25 1.74 0.69
1988 31.97 21.37 9.38 6.79 3.16 1.09 10.60 11.99 2.59 3.63 2.07 1.09
1989 31.55 20.83 8.70 6.13 2.69 0.82 10.71 12.14 2.57 3.44 1.86 0.82
1990 31.81 21.14 9.00 6.41 2.87 0.91 10.67 12.14 2.59 3.54 1.96 0.91
1991 31.44 20.77 8.56 5.97 2.57 0.78 10.67 12.21 2.59 3.40 1.79 0.78
1992 32.46 21.85 9.63 6.97 3.33 1.22 10.61 12.22 2.66 3.64 2.12 1.22
1993 31.85 21.29 9.06 6.41 2.90 0.96 10.56 12.23 2.64 3.51 1.95 0.96
1994 31.54 20.95 8.72 6.07 2.63 0.83 10.59 12.22 2.65 3.44 1.80 0.83
1995 32.43 21.73 9.26 6.52 2.91 0.94 10.70 12.48 2.73 3.62 1.97 0.94
1996 33.16 22.47 9.80 6.97 3.21 1.11 10.69 12.66 2.83 3.77 2.10 1.11
1997 33.88 23.19 10.43 7.54 3.67 1.36 10.70 12.75 2.89 3.88 2.31 1.36
1998 34.34 23.73 10.98 8.08 4.12 1.65 10.61 12.76 2.89 3.96 2.48 1.65
1999 35.11 24.50 11.64 8.71 4.67 1.98 10.61 12.85 2.94 4.04 2.69 1.98
2000 36.03 25.42 12.61 9.64 5.44 2.45 10.62 12.84 2.99 4.24 3.03 2.45
Notes: Computations by authors on tax return statistics. Taxpayers are ranked by wages and salaries (which includes exercise of stock options).
Groups are defined relative to all tax units with wage income (filers and non-filers).
The Table reports the percentage of total wages and salaries accruing to each of the top groups. Top 10% denotes to top decile, 
top 10-5% denotes the bottom half of the top decile, etc.
Table C1. Top Wage Income Shares in the United States, 1960-2000Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top .5% Top .1% Top .01% Top 10-5% Top 5-1% Top 1-.5% Top .5-.1% Top .1-.01% Top MTR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1960 28.48 32.11 43.20 48.83 60.05 67.48 22.73 26.36 33.18 42.83 58.02 87
1962 29.44 33.06 44.39 50.08 61.05 71.97 23.78 27.31 34.53 44.53 58.41 87
1964 27.67 30.95 40.91 45.51 54.86 62.81 22.52 25.91 33.01 40.88 52.97 77
1966 26.96 30.06 39.99 45.02 53.91 60.45 22.10 25.09 31.28 40.49 52.26 70
1967 27.54 30.83 40.93 45.61 54.10 60.52 22.31 25.69 32.86 41.31 52.46 70
1968 30.68 34.27 45.35 50.15 58.22 63.79 25.01 28.70 37.08 46.02 56.79 75.25
1969 31.93 35.58 46.27 50.90 57.96 60.48 26.23 30.29 38.38 47.31 57.27 77
1970 30.96 34.57 45.36 49.72 56.25 60.53 25.32 29.32 38.07 46.51 55.20 71.75
1971 30.61 34.40 45.08 49.09 55.05 57.32 24.68 29.11 38.35 46.13 54.48 60
1972 31.48 35.24 45.08 48.05 50.27 50.52 25.56 30.24 39.89 46.92 50.21 50
1973 32.78 36.70 46.01 48.43 50.04 49.97 26.55 31.95 41.86 47.63 50.06 50
1974 34.10 38.19 47.05 49.22 49.94 49.66 27.45 33.55 43.17 48.84 50.02 50
1975 34.30 37.99 46.01 48.14 49.63 49.61 28.38 33.75 42.17 47.35 49.64 50
1976 36.04 39.76 47.27 48.94 49.30 48.10 30.01 35.76 44.24 48.74 49.64 50
1977 38.44 42.50 49.58 50.46 50.13 48.84 31.84 38.68 47.94 50.65 50.50 50
1978 40.06 43.93 49.95 50.37 50.19 49.02 33.67 40.63 49.18 50.47 50.52 50
1979 40.21 44.19 49.92 50.31 49.10 47.63 33.62 40.97 49.17 50.99 49.55 50
1980 41.90 45.38 49.57 49.69 48.28 47.06 36.05 42.97 49.34 50.53 48.67 50
1981 42.87 45.69 48.67 48.49 47.07 46.53 38.12 43.99 49.01 49.34 47.24 50
1982 39.14 41.61 44.64 44.70 44.12 43.13 34.93 39.83 44.52 45.05 44.44 50
1983 37.00 39.35 43.14 44.25 45.15 45.33 32.91 37.06 40.89 43.69 45.08 50
1984 35.94 38.24 41.91 42.95 42.83 44.71 31.84 35.96 39.69 43.03 42.16 50
1985 36.24 38.62 42.54 43.51 44.80 44.54 32.01 36.19 40.52 42.65 44.90 50
1986 36.47 38.95 43.20 44.10 44.71 44.37 32.05 36.32 41.30 43.69 44.84 50
1987 33.32 35.19 37.01 36.82 36.67 36.91 29.79 33.93 37.45 36.93 36.58 38.5
1988 28.79 29.28 28.91 27.73 27.10 26.61 27.81 29.56 32.00 28.29 27.36 28
1989 28.89 29.46 29.09 27.92 27.25 27.33 27.78 29.72 31.89 28.45 27.22 28
1990 28.97 29.61 29.42 28.32 27.73 27.76 27.71 29.75 32.15 28.79 27.71 28
1991 29.57 30.62 32.06 31.71 31.35 31.26 27.52 29.60 32.89 31.98 31.39 31
1992 29.64 30.66 31.88 31.51 31.35 31.24 27.55 29.69 32.85 31.65 31.42 31
1993 31.78 33.79 38.59 39.46 40.03 39.81 27.74 30.23 36.48 38.99 40.14 39.6
1994 31.83 33.84 38.83 39.60 40.10 40.09 27.85 30.28 37.07 39.22 40.11 39.6
1995 31.96 33.96 38.52 39.04 39.74 39.88 27.91 30.57 37.29 38.48 39.67 39.6
1996 31.75 33.57 37.68 37.98 38.80 39.01 27.92 30.39 36.92 37.28 38.69 39.6
1997 32.51 34.56 39.00 39.51 39.71 39.75 28.08 30.93 37.68 39.32 39.68 39.6
1998 32.95 34.91 39.02 39.43 39.64 39.60 28.56 31.37 37.90 39.21 39.66 39.6
1999 33.13 35.14 38.83 39.33 39.48 39.37 28.50 31.80 37.33 39.17 39.56 39.6
2000 33.31 35.37 38.64 39.23 39.32 39.14 28.44 32.24 36.77 39.13 39.46 39.6
Notes: Marginal Tax Rates on wage income are computed using micro-files of tax returns and the TAXSIM calculator. Marginal tax rates include only federal income 
taxes and ignore state income taxes, as well as payroll taxes. Marginal tax rates are weighted by wage income.
Column (12) reports the top marginal tax rate on labor income. In 1960-1963, the top bracket rate is 91% but there is maximum average tax rate of 87%.
In 1971-1981, the top marginal tax rate for non-labor income is 70% (see Table B2) and the labor income marginal tax rate can be locally larger than reported.
Table C2. Marginal Tax Rates on Wages for Top Wage Income Groups in the United States, 1960-2000